Louisiana Law Review
Volume 56
Number 3 Spring 1996

Article 10

5-1-1996

Co-Ownership of Former Community Property: A Primer on the
New Law
Katherine Shaw Spaht
katherine.spaht@law.lsu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev
Part of the Law Commons

Repository Citation
Katherine Shaw Spaht, Co-Ownership of Former Community Property: A Primer on the New Law, 56 La. L.
Rev. (1996)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol56/iss3/10

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

Co-Ownership of Former Community Property: A Primer*
on the New Law
Katherine Shaw Spaht*"

I. INTRODUCTION

New law governing certain aspects of the co-ownership of former communi-

ty property takes effect on January 1, 1996.' The new law is contained in Act
433 which amends one Civil Code article2 and adds seven others3 in Chapter
2 of Title VI, Book III, ultimately effecting a modification of the principles of

ordinary co-ownership 4 that apply generally to former community property.5
This article first discusses prior law and the scope and temporal effect of the new
law and then comments in detail upon each of the eight new Articles.
A. The Old Law-Civil Code Article 2369.1
Until January 1, 1996, when the community property regime terminated, the

law of ordinary co-ownership applied "unless there [was] contrary provision of
law or juridical act."6 Thus, a community property regime terminated by a
divorce judgment7 resulted in the two former spouses occupying the position of

ordinary co-owners of former community property. An exception to the
application of the law of co-ownership, "contrary provision of law," included
rules embodied in other Articles contained in the same Chapter-such as, the

Copyright 1996, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
*

Although I have chosen to refer to this article as a "primer," the structure of the article

closely resembles the article on the new co-ownership of property by Professor Symeon Symeonides
and Ms. Nicole Martin entitled The New Law of Co-ownership: A Kommentar,68 Tul. L. Rev. 72
(1993). If imitation is the highest form of flattery, then the two authors of that remarkable piece are
deservedly flattered. The form of the Kommentar facilitates its use by lawyers and scholars through
systematic treatment of the law in article by article commentary.
**
Jules F. and Frances L. Landry Professor of Law. The author acknowledges the valuable
assistance of Professor Dian T. Arruebarrena of Loyola University Law School and Mr. Kenneth
Rigby of Shreveport, La.
1. 1995 La. Acts No. 433.
2. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.1.
3. La. Civ. Code arts. 2369.2-2369.8.
4. See generally La. Civ. Code arts. 797-818 (rev. 1990).
5. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.1: "After termination of the community property regime, the
provisions governing co-ownership apply to former community property, unless otherwise provided
by law or by juridical act."
6. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.1, before its amendment by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1.
7. La. Civ. Code art. 159 (rev. 1990) (emphasis added): "A judgment of divorce terminates
a community property regime retroactivelyto the date offiling of the petition in the action in which
the judgment of divorce is rendered."
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right of a pre-termination creditor of one spouse to satisfy his debt from all
former community property not merely the debtor spouse's one-half interest,8
the personal responsibility to pre-termination creditors incurred by a spouse who
disposes of former community property other than for the satisfaction of a
community obligation,9 the right to claim reimbursement,"0 and the duty to
account for former community property under a spouse's control at termination
of the community regime." All of these rules supersede the application of the
law governing ordinary co-owners, because unlike other co-owners the spouses
had a prior property regime that has been described as a "distinct species"'"
of co-ownership. The distinct species of co-ownership, the community of
acquets and gains, recognizes that by virtue of the intimate relationship of
marriage the spouses have a unique partnership that consists of property rights
and obligations justifying special rules. 3 As a consequence, it is necessary to
provide for the appropriate extension of those rules even after termination of the
community property regime.
In all other respects, the relationship of the spouses 4 as to former community property before January 1, 1996, was identical to that of other ordinary co-

8. La. Civ. Code art. 2357 (rev. 1990):
An obligation incurred by a spouse before or during the community property regime may
be satisfied after termination of the regime from property of the former community and
from the separate property of the spouse who incurred the obligation. The same rule
applies to an obligation for attorney's fees and costs in an action for divorce incurred by
a spouse between the date the petition for divorce was filed and the date of the judgment
of divorce that terminates the community regime.
See generally Katherine S. Spaht & W. Lee Hargrave, 16 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise,
Matrimonial Regimes §§ 7.9-7.11 (1989 & Supp. 1995).
9. La. Civ. Code art. 2357 (rev. 1990): "If a spouse disposes of property of the former
community for a purpose other than the satisfaction of community obligations, he is liable for all
obligations incurred by the other spouse up to the value of that community property." See generally
Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 8, §§ 7.9-7.11.
10. See La. Civ. Code arts. 2358-2368 (rev. 1979) which the jurisprudence has extended to the
expenditure of former community property or separate property after termination of the community
regime. See, e.g., Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 8, § 7.14, at 289-91.
11. La. Civ. Code art. 2369 (1979): "A spouse owes an accounting to the other spouse for
community property under his control at the termination of the community property regime. The
obligation to account prescribes in three years from the date of termination of the community
property regime." See generally Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 8, § 7.19.
12. La. Civ. Code art. 2337 cmt. a (rev. 1979).
13. See La. Civ. Code art. 2369.1 cmt. c (as amended by 1995 La. Acts No. 443, § 1).
14. Under La. Civ. Code art. 2356, the community regime may terminate during the existence
of a marriage for the cause of judgment of separation of property (La. Civ. Code art. 2374) or
matrimonial agreement (La. Civ. Code art. 2329), and thus the two co-owners are spouses. In fact
the new legislation itself uses the term "spouse" to refer to the two co-owners for the sake of
simplicity of expression:
In fact, co-owners offormer community property are sometimes still spouses, for example,
when a separation of property is decreed at the request of a spouse under Civil Code
Article 2374 (rev. 1979), but are more often former spouses who must hold former
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owners 5 with the exception, arguably, of former community property when the
community regime terminated by death. As the author has argued before, 6

spouses or former spouses whose community regime has terminated are peculiar
co-owners "because they are less likely to remain on friendly terms or to
continue to share a common purpose."'" Particularly in the case of a divorce
judgment that terminates the community regime, "the law can no longer assume
that management decisions concerning common property will be made weighing
the same considerations as during the partnership."'"
Ordinary co-owners

usually share a common interest in only one, or no more than a few, assets. As
long as they are in agreement, there is little need to regulate the relationship.

Thus, the legal rules governing the relationship of co-owners need concern
primarily the right to demand a partition 9 and how that partition is to be
accomplished.20 Other rules regulating the relationship address the right to

products, 2' use and management of the thing when there is no agreement, 22 the

right to make substantial alterations or improvements to the thing,23 and
responsibility for different types of expenses.24 Application of these rules to

community property in co-ownership during the period of months or years that often
ensues between the entry of a judgment of divorce and the judicial or extrajudicial
partition of that former community property. Whichever is the situation in a given case,
these Articles apply to spouse or former spouse co-owners of former community property
until that property is partitioned.
La. Civ. Code art. 2369.1 cmt. d (as amended by 1995 La. Acts No. 443, § 1).
15. See La. Civ. Code arts. 797-818. For a comprehensive treatment of each of the articles in
chronological order, see Symeon C. Symeonides & Nicole D. Martin, The New Law of CoOwnership: A Kommentar, 68 Tul. L. Rev. 701 (1993).
16. See Katherine S. Spaht, Developments in the Law 1989-1990-Matrimonial Regimes, 51
La. L. Rev. 321 (1990) [hereinafter Developments 1989-1990]; Katherine S. Spaht, Post-Dissolution
Management of Former Community Property: An Unresolved Problem, 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 705
(1990) [hereinafter Post-Dissolution Management]; Katherine S. Spaht, Developments in the Law
1986-1987 Matrimonial Regimes, 48 La. L. Rev. 371 (1987).
17. Spaht, Post-Dissolution Management, supra note 16, at 729.
18. Id. at 729.
19. La. Civ. Code art. 807 (rev. 1990).
20. La. Civ. Code arts. 810-816 (rev. 1990).
21. La. Civ. Code art. 798 (rev. 1990).
22. La. Civ. Code arts. 802-803 (rev. 1990).
23. La. Civ. Code art. 804 (rev. 1990).
24. For example, substantial alterations or improvements:
When a co-owner makes substantial alterations or substantial improvements consistent
with the use of the property, though without the express or implied consent of his coowners, the rights of the parties shall be determined by Article 496. When a co-owner
makes substantial alterations or substantial improvements inconsistent with the use of the
property or in spite of the objections of his co-owners, the rights of the parties shall be
determined by Article 497.
La. Civ. Code art. 804 (rev. 1990).
Consider the difference if the expenses are for maintenance and management:
A co-owner who on account of the thing held in indivision has incurred necessary
expenses, expenses for ordinary maintenance and repairs, or necessary management
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former community property are in some cases inappropriate' and in others
contradictory to special statutes governing former spouses.26

expenses paid to a third person, is entitled to reimbursement from the other co-owners in
proportion to their shares.
If the co-owner who incurred the expenses had the enjoyment of the thing held in
indivision, his reimbursement shall be reduced in proportion to the value of the
enjoyment.
La. Civ. Code art. 806 (rev. 1990).
25. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code art. 802 (rev. 1990):
Except as otherwise provided in Article 801, a co-owner is entitled to use the thing held
in indivision according to its destination, but he cannot prevent another co-owner from
making such use of it. As against third persons, a co-owner has the right to use and enjoy
the thing as if he were the sole owner.
La. Civ. Code art. 803 (rev. 1990): "When the mode of use and management of the thing held
in indivision is not determined by an agreement of all the co-owners and partition is not available,
a court, upon petition by a co-owner, may determine the use and management."
Consider also the power of a co-owner to dispose of or to manage his undivided one-half share
of former community property, registered movables and a former community enterprise. Under the
rules of ordinary co-ownership, a co-owner may "freely lease, alienate, or encumber his share of the
thing held in indivision." La. Civ. Code art. 805 (rev. 1990). During the existence of the community
regime, neither husband nor wife may dispose of his or her undivided one-half share of community
property. La. Civ. Code art. 2337 (rev. 1979). To permit either spouse to alienate his interest after
termination of the community regime before a partition would permit either spouse to avoid the
provisions of the special statute governing the judicial partition of community property. La. R.S.
9:2801 (1991 & Supp. 1996). During the existence of the community regime, two examples of sole
and exclusive management of community property are the alienation of the movables of a community
enterprise by the managing spouse (La. Civ. Code art. 2350) and the alienation of registered
movables by the spouse in whose name the movable is registered (La. Civ. Code art. 2351). No such
parallel explicitly exists under the law of co-ownership.
26. La. R.S. 9:374(C) (1991 & Supp. 1996):
A spouse who uses and occupies or is awarded by the court the use and occupancy of the
family residence pending either the termination of the marriage or the partition of the
community property in accordance with the provisions of R.S. 9:374(A) or (B) shall not
be liable to the other spouse for rental for the use and occupancy, unless otherwise agreed
by the spouses or ordered by the court.
Compare La. Civ. Code art. 802 (rev. 1990); and supra text accompanying note 25.
This special statute arguably conflicts with the provisions of La. Civ. Code art. 806 (rev. 1990) if
the family residence is co-owned and the use is awarded to one spouse (or one spouse simply uses
it) after termination of the community regime. Under La. K S. 9:374(C) (1991 & Supp. 1996), the
spouse who occupies former community property (now co-owned) owes no rent unless agreed to or
ordered by the court. However, for ordinary co-owners under La. Civ. Code art. 806 (rev. 1990) the
value of enjoyment by a spouse who occupies the family home is to be deducted from what is owed
him for necessary expenses. General principles of interpretation render La. R.S. 9:374(C) (1991 &
Supp. 1996) applicable since it is the more specific (applying to only one type ofco-ownership under
certain circumstances).
There is a reference to the predecessor of La. R.S. 9:374 (1991 &Supp. 1996), which was La. RLS.
9:308, in La. Civ. Code art. 802 cmt. b (rev. 1990): "For the use of the family residence and of
community movables and immovables after the filing of a petition for separation of [sic] divorce, see
R.S. 9:308." This reference recognizes that the special statute is an exception to the content of
Article 802.
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The inadequacy of the general rules of co-ownership resulted primarily from
the omission of affirmative duties to preserve co-owned property or to manage
it prudently. For example, an ordinary co-owner is PERMITTED, but not
required, to "take necessary steps for the preservation of the thing that is held in
'
indivision."27
A co-owner is entitled to use the thing" absent an agreement,
but is liable to his co-owner "for any damage to the thing held in indivision
'
caused by his fault."29
The comment to the Article imposing liability for
damage to the thing creates ambiguity as to the standard of care the co-owner
must exercise in using and managing the thing.30 In the case of divorced
spouses, an explicit standard of care for managing former community property
and an affirmative duty to preserve property until a partition seemed imperative.
B. The Scope of Act 433 of 1995
The new Act applies to former community property, which is co-extensive at
times with patrimony and at times with things that were classified as community
property during the regime. 3' Patrimony is the broader and more inclusive term:
"the total mass of existing or potential rights and liabilities attached to a person for
the satisfaction ofhis economic needs."32 Things, by contrast, ordinarily is used33
to refer to "objects susceptible of appropriation and of pecuniary evaluation.1
Ifpropertyin Article 2369.1 means patrimonywhich includes liabilities, then the
former spouses co-own not only things but also obligations. Yet the Civil Code
articles governing ordinary co-ownership to which Article 2369.1 refers only
govern the co-ownership of things34 and rights.35 If a right does not necessarily
27.

La. Civ. Code art. 800 (rev. 1990).

The comment explains: "This is not unauthorized

management of the affairs of another under Civil Code Article 2295 (1870)." For the distinction
between conservatory acts, acts of administration, and acts of disposition, see A.N. Yiannopoulos,
Personal Servitudes § 37, in 3 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (2d ed. 1978); Gabriel BaudryLacantinerie, Traite Theorique et pratique de droit civil, III Supplement by Bonnecase 630-686
(1926).
28.
29.
30.

La. Civ. Code art. 802 (rev. 1990).
La. Civ. Code art. 799 (rev. 1990).
"This provision is new. It expresses a principle inherent in the Louisiana Civil Code of

1870. Cf C.C. Arts. 576 (Rev. 1976) and 2315 (1870)." La. Civ. Code art. 799 cmt. (rev. 1990).
For somewhat differing views on the interpretation of Article 799, see Symeonides & Martin, supra

note 15, at 101-12; and Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 8, § 7.19, at 139-40.
31. La. Civ. Code art. 2325 cmt. b: "Following the terminology of the 1870 Code, the word
'property' in this revision is at times used to mean things (see, e.g., Articles 2338, 2365, infra),and
at times to mean patrimony (see, e.g., Articles 2325, 2335, 2374-2376, infra)."
32. Due v. Due, 342 So. 2d 161, 165 (1977) (quoting from A.N. Yiannopoulos, Property § 77,
in 2 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1976)).
33. A.N. Yiannopoulos, Property § 15, at 29, in 2 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1991).
34. La. Civ. Code art. 797 (rev. 1990) (emphasis added): "Ownership of the same thingby two
or more persons is ownership in indivision."
35. La. Civ. Code art. 818 (rev. 1990): "The provisions governing co-ownership apply to other
rights held in indivision to the extent compatible with the nature of those rights." The examples in
the official comment likewise concern the right but not the obligation.
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include the correlative obligation,36 then community obligations incurred by either
spouse during the existence of the community regime" are not governed by the
rules on co-ownership.3
Even if obligations are to be included as the correlative of rights,39 there is no
article in the Title on Ownership in Division ' that governs an obligation incurred
by one co-owner before the beginning ofthe co-ownership relationship. Co-owners
of former community property differ from ordinary co-owners in that they share a
"community of interest" in some obligations incurred before their co-ownership
relationship began. In recognition that co-owners of former community property
are different, the court should decide "equitably" according to "justice, reason, and
prevailing usages" ' if the issue concerns satisfaction ofa spouse's obligation that
was incurred during the existence of the community regime. Initially at least, the
court should distinguish between obligations incurred during the existence of the
community regime and obligations incurred after termination of the regime. The
former arguably are not governed by the new Act or the articles on co-ownership;
whereas, the latter are governed by the articles on co-ownership which remain
unmodified by the new Act.42
For example, an obligation incurred prior to the termination ofthe community
regime43 may be satisfied from the entire former community property, including
the interest of the co-owner spouse who did not incur the obligation." If the
obligation is incurred after termination of the community regime, it may be
satisfied only from the undivided one-half interest in former community property

36. For example, see La. Civ. Code art. 1763 (rev. 1984): "A real obligation is a duty
correlative and incidental to a real right."
37. La. Civ. Code arts. 2359-2362 (rev. 1979).
38. One obvious example that La. Civ. Code art. 2369.1 recognizes is the liability of former
community property for obligations incurred prior to termination of the regime under La. Civ. Code art.
2357 (rev. 1990). La. Civ. Code art. 2369.1 cmt. c (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1) states:
The phrase "unless otherwise provided by law" refers to other provisions of Section 3 ofthis
Chapter ofTitle VI ofBook III of the Civil Code, such as Article 2357 (rev. 1979). These
articles depart from the principles governing ordinary co-owners on the basis that the unique
and peculiar species of co-ownership, the community ofacquets and gains, has previously
existed between the spouses. Thus, Article 2357 provides that obligations incurred by a
spouse prior to termination ofthe community regime may be satisfied from the entirety of
former community property.
39. La. Civ. Code art. 473 (rev. 1978): "Rights, obligations, and actions that apply to a
movable thing are incorporeal movables."
40. Title VII ofBook II, entitled "Ownership in Division," consists ofLa. Civ. Code arts. 797818 (rev. 1990).
La. Civ. Code art. 4: "When no rule for a particular situation can be derived from
41.
legislation or custom, the court is bound to proceed according to equity. To decide equitably, resort
is made to justice, reason, and prevailing usages."
42. La. Civ. Code art. 806 (rev. 1990) (concerns recovery ofnecessary expenses for co-owned
property).
43. See supra note 38. See also La. Civ. Code art. 2369.1 cmt. c (as added by 1995 La. Acts
No. 433, § 1).
44. La. Civ. Code art. 2357 (rev. 1990).
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of the obligor spouse.4' By virtue of the "unique and peculiar species of coownership" that existed previously between the spouses, an obligation incurred
before termination ofthe regime is not subject to the law ofco-ownership, at least
as to third parties.' Arguably, the same treatment exempting pre-termination
obligations from co-ownership rules should apply as between the spouses who now
find themselves co-owners.
The new Act applies only if the community regime terminates for certain
causes:' 7 declaration of nullity of the marriage,' judgment of divorce,""
judgment of separation of property,50 or matrimonial agreement.5 The new Act
does not apply if the cause of termination of the regime is death or judgment of
declaration of death. 52 The reason for excluding application of the new article
when the community regime terminates by death will be discussed in Part II.
Any claim one former spouse may have against the other, either under the new
Act or under the Civil Code articles on co-ownership, may be asserted in the
judicial partition. The Legislature amended Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2801,
governingjudicial partition offormer community property, in the new Act to permit
the court to hear and resolve all claims between the former spouses, whether arising
from the community regime that previously existed or arising since its termination.53
C. TemporalEffect
Section 3 of the new Act deals in detail with the temporal effect of its
changes.' The general effective date is January 1, 1996; but the new Act is

45. See Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 8, § 7.9, at 256.
46. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.1 cmt. c (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1).
47. La. Civ. Code art. 2356 (rev. 1990): "The legal regime of community property is
terminated by the death or judgment of declaration of death of a spouse, declaration of the nullity
of the marriage, judgment of divorce or separation of property, or matrimonial agreement that
terminates the community."
48. La. Civ. Code arts. 96 (rev. 1987) (absolutely null marriage); and 97 (rev. 1987) (relatively
null marriage).
49. La. Civ. Code art. 159 (rev. 1990).
50. La. Civ. Code arts. 2374-2375 (rev. 1993).
51. La. Civ. Code art. 2328 (rev. 1979).
52. La. Civ. Code arts. 54-59 (rev. 1990).
53. La. R.S. 9:2801 (1991 & Supp. 1996) (as amended by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 2)
(emphasis added):
When the spouses are unable to agree on a partition of community property or on the
settlement of the claims between the spouses arising either from the matrimonial regime,
or from the co-ownership offormer communityproperty followingtermination of the
matrimonial regime, either spouse, as an incident of the action that would result in a

termination of the matrimonial regime or upon termination of the matrimonial regime or
thereafter, may institute a proceeding, which shall be conducted in accordance with the
following rules....
54. For a comparable provision, see 1978 La. Acts No. 627, § 9:
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much more specific about the meaning of the effective date. The property to be
governed by the new Act is "former community property that is co-owned by
spouses or former spouses on or after January 1, 1996, regardless of when the
community regime of the spouses or former spouses terminated.""5 If the
community regime terminated before January 1, 1996, and former community
property remains unpartitioned, the new Act applies but with limitations. No
asset acquired or fruit or product accrued prior to January 1, 1996, would change
characterization under the new Act. 56 This provision was added out of an
abundance of caution even though it is doubtful that a reasonable construction
of the new Act would have resulted in a reclassification of such assets or fruits
or products.57
The first of the remaining two provisions of Section 3 protects the validity
of "any act or transaction made prior to January 1, 1996, by a spouse or former
spouse according to the law in force at the time of the act or transaction."5"
This provision assures that explicit changes in the dispositive power of a coowner spouse59 do not suggest that the spouse did not have such power before
the new Act. For example, general co-ownership law permits either co-owner
to dispose of his undivided share but requires the concurrence of all co-owners
to dispose of the entire co-owned property.' Section 3 provides protection for
the former spouse who disposed of his undivided one-half share to a third person
before January 1, 1996, even though under the new Act he cannot. At the same
time, Section 3 recognizes that even though the new Act makes exceptions to the
general law of co-ownership explicit, the same result may have obtained under
the law effective before January 1, 1996. For example, the new Act contains an

Except for R.S. 9:2831 through 2835, Section 1, Section 2, Section 6, Section 7, and
Section 8 of this Act shall take effect on January 1, 1980, and shall be applicable to the
property and obligations of all spouses whether the spouses were married or whether
property was acquired or an obligation was incurred prior to or after January 1, 1980,
unless the spouses have adopted a matrimonial regime by express contract; provided, that
Part II of Chapter 2 of Section 1 of this Act shall not be construed to change the

characterization as community or separate of assets acquired or fruits and revenues
accrued prior to January 1, 1980, nor to invalidate any act or transaction made prior to
January 1, 1980 by a spouse according to the law in force at the time of the act or
transaction.
All other provisions of this Act shall take effect on the sixtieth day after final
adjournment of the 1979 Regular Session and shall be applicable to the property and
obligations of all spouses whether the spouses were married or their property acquired or
obligations incurred prior to or after the effective date of these provisions.
55. 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 3.
56. 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 3: "Nothing in this Act shall be construed to change the
characterization of assets acquired or fruits and products accrued prior to January 1, 1996."
57. See infra part II (discussion of La. Civ. Code art. 2369.2 in the Article-by-Article
commentary).
58. 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 3.
59. La. Civ. Code arts. 2369.5-2369.7 (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § I).
60. La. Civ. Code art. 805 (rev. 1990).
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exception to the general principle that both co-owners must consent to the
alienation of the co-owned thing: a spouse in whose name a former community
movable is registered may alone alienate it. An alienation by the spouse in
whose name a former community movable is registered probably was valid
before January 1, 1996, through the application of other statutes that supersede
principles of co-ownership. 6'
The latter of the remaining provisions of Section 3 addresses the more
serious issue, the application of the explicit duty to preserve former community
property and to manage it subject to a more stringent standard of care. 62 The
last sentence of Section 3 reads: "Nor shall a spouse or former spouse incur an
obligation imposed by this Act for any action taken before January 1, 1996, with
respect to former community property, unless the spouse or former spouse was
'
obligated according to the law in force at the time the action was taken."63
Absent that sentence, under the first sentence of Section 3, the new Act would
apply to former community property on January 1, 1996. If acts of a spouse
performed before January 1, 1996, violated the duty "to preserve and to manage
prudently former community property" under a spouse's control "in a manner
consistent with the mode ofuse of that property immediately prior to termination
of the community regime,"6 an argument could be made that the spouse is
"answerable for any damage caused by his fault, default, or neglect."' 6 The
comments to Article 2369.3 explain that the Article changes the law.67 In doing

61. The new Act permits the spouse in whose name a former community movable is registered
to alienate it without the other co-owner's consent. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.5 (as added by 1995 La.
Acts No. 433, § 1). Even though this is a departure from principles governing ordinary co-owners,
statutory schemes governing a particular registered movable, such as a motor vehicle or stock, may
well have permitted the same transaction, superseding the application of general co-ownership
principles (the more specific prevailing over the more general). See infra text accompanying notes
245-247.
62. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.3 (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1).
63. 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 3.
64. "This Act applies to former community property that is co-owned by spouses or former
spouses on or after January 1, 1996, regardless of when the community regime of the spouses or
former spouses terminated." 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 3.
65. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.3 (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1).
66. Id.
67. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.3 cmt. a (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1):
This Article changes the law. First it imposes on a spouse who has control of former
community property an affirmative duty "to preserve and to manage" such property. In
contrast, Civil Code Article 800 (rev. 1990), applicable to ordinary co-owners, provides
for a right but not a duty to act for the preservation of the property. Such a duty arises
only if the co-owner undertakes to act as a negotiorum gestor or he is appointed as
administrator. See Symeonides & Martin, The New Law of Co-ownership: A
Kommentar, 68 Tul. L. Rev. 72, 102 (1993). Similarly, the co-ownership articles of the
Civil Code do not impose on one co-owner an affirmative duty to manage the co-owned
thing unless that owner assumed the qualities of a gestor or was appointed as an
administrator. Second, this Article imposes a higher standard of care than that provided
by Civil Code Article 799 (rev. 1990) for ordinary co-owners.
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so, the redactors did not intend to punish acts of a spouse performed before
January 1, 1996, that were not actionable at the time,6 an intention clearly
expressed in the last sentence of Section 3.
II.

ARTICLE BY ARTICLE COMMENTARY

A. Article 2369.1. Application of Co-ownership Provisions
After terminationof the community propertyregime, theprovisions
governing co-ownership apply to former community property, unless
otherwiseprovided by law or by juridicalact.
When the community propertyregime terminatesfor a cause other
than death or judgment of declaration of death of a spouse, the
following Articles of this Subsection also apply to former community
property until a partition, or the death orjudgment of declarationof
death of a spouse.

1. FirstParagraphComparison to Predecessor

The first paragraph of this Article is virtually identical to its predecessor.69
The only language changes consist of adding "to former community property"
so that the verb apply has an object and of substituting "otherwise provided by
law" for "there is contrary provision of law" after the word unless. Neither of
these alterations makes substantive changes in the law. Examples of as
"otherwise provided by law" appear in Part I.A. Juridicalact has a doctrinal
definition: a declaration of will intended to produce legal consequences to which
declaration the law attributes those or other legal consequences.7"

68. A similar issue was considered in the recent case of Succession of Steckler, 665 So. 2d 561
(La. App. 5th Cir. 1995). The defendant, whom plaintiff claimed had been disinherited, argued that
the alleged grounds for disinherison (failure to communicate without just cause for two years) had
been added to La. Civ. Code art. 1621 in 1985; and consequently, his inaction or other conduct
before the effective date of the amendment could not be considered. The court agreed: "It [La. Civ.
Code art. 1621 (12)] cannot be applied retroactively to this case because it would effectively divest
plaintiff of his right of inheritance to not less than a fixed portion of his parent's estate based on
action, or inaction, by plaintiff that was not prescribed [sic] at the time the acts took place." 665 So.
2d at 564.
Whether the court was correct in concluding that there would be a retroactive application of Article
1621(12) if it applied to conduct before its effective date, the Legislature intended in Act 433 of 1995
to protect a former spouse who behaved in accordance with law before the effective date of the Act
only to discover that after January 1, 1996, such conduct was proscribed.
69. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.1 (added by 1990 La. Acts No. 991, § 1): "After termination of
the community property regime, the provisions governing co-ownership apply unless there is contrary
provision of law or juridical act."
70. Areference to juridical act appears in La. Civ. Code art. 28 (rev. 1987) concerning capacity
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2. Cause of Termination
As mentioned in Part I.B., the Civil Code articles of the new Act apply only
if the community regime terminates by a judgment of divorce, judgment of
separation of property, declaration of nullity of a marriage, or a matrimonial
agreement terminating the community regime.7 ' The new articles do not apply
in two instances: if the community regime terminates by death or declaration of
death. The explanation for the omission of termination by death or declaration
of death lies in the content of the changes made by the new Act.
The focal point of the changes made by the new Act is the imposition of
new affirmative duties. The Articles explicitly impose a duty to preserve former
community property under one's control and to manage such property prudently,
as measured against a relatively precise standard.72 A comment to Article
2369.3 expresses the rationale underlying the change: . . . after termination of
the community property regime, the law no longer assumes that a spouse who
has former community property under his control will act in the best interest of
both spouses in managing it."" Clearly, such rationale applies if the community regime terminates during the lifetime ofboth spouses and under circumstances
that suggest the two no longer share a common purpose as to their personal life,
and hence as to their property. In fact, the interest of one of these co-owners
may be hostile to the interest of the other. If the community regime terminates
by reason of death of a spouse or a declaration of death of a spouse after an
absence of five years, the survivor will not necessarily be hostile to the interests
of the heirs or legatees of the deceased; this is especially true when the survivor
is the parent of the deceased's heirs or legatees.74 Furthermore, the interrelationship between community property law and successions law, not to mention
the law of co-ownership, has never been adequately resolved."

to makejuridical acts. The comments, however, do not define the term. La. Civ. Code art. 28 cmt.
b states simply: "itestablishes the general principle that a person who has reached majority has
capacity to make all sorts of juridical acts, unilateral or bilateral."
Two articles of the Civil Code on Obligations recognize a juridical act. First, La. Civ. Code art.
1756 (rev. 1985) (emphasis added) states: "An obligation is a legal relationship whereby a person,
called the obligor, is bound to render a performance in favor of another, called the obligee." Then,
La. Civ. Code art. 1757 (rev. 1985) (emphasis added) explains: "Obligations arise from contracts and
other declarations of will."
71. La. Civ. Code art. 2356 (rev. 1990).
72. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.3 (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1).
73. Id. at cmt. a.
74. The author recognizes that recent changes in forced heirship law may well exacerbate
squabbles between the surviving spouse and the deceased's heirs or legatees. At the time the Council
ofthe Louisiana Law Institute was considering the legislation for recommendation to the Legislature,
there was no proposed constitutional amendment to eliminate forced heirship for children over the
age of 24. See La. Const. art. XII, § 5.
75. See Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 8, § 7.29. See also Karl W. Cavanaugh, Problems in
the Law ofSuccessions: Succession Representatives, Surviving Spouses, and Usufructuaries, 47 La.
L. Rev. 21 (1986); Succession of Pailet, 602 So. 2d 152 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1992); Gauthier v.
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3. Law Applicable If Termination by Death or DeclarationofDeath
For the reasons above mentioned, the Legislature chose to limit the
application of the new Act to instances where the community property regime
terminates for a cause that may incite hostility between the spouses. The
Legislature was unwilling to assume that if the community property regime
terminates by death or declaration of death that the same hostility exists between
the surviving spouse and the heirs and legatees of the deceased spouse.
Therefore, the Legislature chose to exempt former community property owned
in indivision at death or declaration of death from the special rules of the new
Act. As a consequence, the law of co-ownership76 with all its strength and
deficiencies will govern the management and disposition of former community
property owned in indivision by the surviving spouse and heirs or legatees after
the death or declaration of death" of a spouse.
The Legislature has always resisted any interference with the procedure for
administration of successions.7" Under the jurisprudence, however, when and
if there is an administration of succession property, the succession representative79 has de jure possession of the entire community property, including the
share of the surviving spouse.s' The surviving spouse and the heirs or legatees
do not enjoy equivalent protection from mismanagement or disposition of former
community property afforded to a divorced spouse until there is an administration
of the succession property.8 ' Yet, the administration of succession property
deprives the surviving spouse of control over her interest in former community
property unless the survivor is the succession representative. The consequence
of exempting former community property from the new rules after death may be
to encourage further the administration of succession property.

Gauthier, 502 So. 2d 140 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987); Succession of Brown, 468 So. 2d 794 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1985); Succession of Dunham, 428 So. 2d 876 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
76. La. Civ. Code arts. 797-818 (rev. 1990).
77. There may be a declaration of death rendered in three instances: (1) when "a person has
disappeared under circumstances such that his death seems certain." (La. Civ. Code art. 30 (rev.
1990)); (2) when a person is missing while on active duty in one ofthe armed services ofthe United
States and the service accepts the presumption of death (La. R.S. 9:1441-1443 (1991)); and (3) when
a person has been an absent person (whose whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by
diligent effort under La. Civ. Code art. 47 (rev. 1990)) for five years (La. Civ. Code art. 54 (rev.
1990)).
78. Katherine Spaht & Cynthia Samuel, Equal Management Revisited: 1979 Legislative
Modifications of the 1978 Matrimonial Regimes Law, 40 La. L. Rev. 83, 141 (1979): "Although at
public hearings the opinion was expressed that the articles on successions would apply if the
community is dissolved by death, no scheme is provided delineating the applicability of the various
interrelated provisions." See also supra note 75.

79.

La. Code Civ. P. arts. 3091-3098 (administrator); and 3081-3083 (executor).

80.

See supra note 75.

81.

La. Code Civ. P. arts. 3081-3395.
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4. Co-ownership Rules Plus New Special Rules
As to former community property subject to the new Act, the new Civil
Code articles merely displace some of the rules governing ordinary co-owners.
The result is that the law of ordinary co-ownership applies supplemented by
some ofthe unique provisions necessitated by the existence of the spouses' prior
community regime"2 and by the special rules of the new Act. 3
The interrelationship of the co-ownership articles and the articles ofthe new
Act are explored article by article in this Part. Most of the articles on co-

ownership are displaced entirely or at least modified by the new articles. One
of the articles displaces the law of co-ownership by imposing affirmative duties
to preserve and manage prudently former community property." To determine

if the new Articles applies requires resolution of the issue of whether former
community property is "under a spouse's control." If so, then the new Article
applies. If a spouse does not have "control" of former community property, then
the law of co-ownership applies, and the spouse does not have the new
responsibilities of preservation and particularized prudent management.8 5
Furthermore, a spouse who incurs expenses complying with the new obligation
to preserve and to manage prudently former community property under his
"control" can more easily recover a proportionate amount from his co-owner.'
A reminder, however, about the recovery of expenses under the law of coownership: a distinction should be drawn between obligations incurred during
the existence of the community regime that continue after termination and are

82. E.g., La. Civ. Code arts. 2357 (rev. 1990) (responsibility to pre-termination creditors); 23582368 (rev. 1979, 1990) (reimbursement); and 2369 (rev. 1979) (duty to account). See discussion
supra part I.A.
83. La. Civ. Code arts. 2369.2-2369.8 (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1).
84. See La. Civ. Code art. 2369.3 (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1).
85. See discussion infra parts II.C.1. and 2. La. Civ. Code art. 3506(13) defines fault as
follows: "There are in law three degrees of faults: the gross, the slight, and the very slight fault.
"The slight fault is that want of care which a prudent man usually takes of his business."
The law of co-ownership permits a co-owner spouse who has already incurred expenses for
ordinary maintenance and repairs to recover reimbursement from other co-owners but does not require
that he make the repairs in the first instance. La. Civ. Code art. 806 (rev. 1990). More importantly,
however, La. Civ. Code art. 800 (rev. 1990), merely permits but does not require a co-owner to take
necessary steps to preserve the thing.
La. Civ. Code art. 799 (rev. 1990) is the only article that addresses the ordinary co-owner's
liability to other co-owners for damage to the thing: "A co-owner is liable to his co-owner for any
damage to the thing held in indivision caused by his fault" The liability is specifically attached to
damage to the thing. Furthermore, fault only suggests a relatively low standard of care-a prudent
man standard without affirmative duties. See La. Civ. Code art. 799 cmt. (rev. 1990).
See Spaht,Developments 1989-1990, supra note 16, at 328-332; Symeonides & Martin, supra note
15, at 72, 106-12; and see generally Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 8, § 7.19.
86. See discussion infra part II.C.7.
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satisfied by one spouse and obligations incurred after termination of the
community regime while the spouses are co-owners.8 7
5. Until Partition,Death, or DeclarationofDeath
The special rules imposed in the new Act apply in conjunction with the
articles on co-ownership until co-ownership ends by partition," or until the
death or declaration of death of a spouse. For the same reasons explained in
II.A.3., the Legislature concluded that the special rules provided in the new
articles should cease to apply when a spouse dies or is declared dead subsequent
to termination of the community regime for another cause. The Legislature's
decision represents strong resistance to the application of any rules to a spouse
or a former spouse other than those of ordinary co-ownership and succession
procedure after the death of the other spouse. In particular, there is continuing
resistance to any interference in the administration of the estate of a deceased
spouse or former spouse by the application of any special rules.8 9
6. Meaning of Spouse
The new articles refer to the co-owners of former community property as
spouses. Even though a community property regime terminated by divorce or
declaration of nullity means that the two co-owners are no longer spouses, the
articles use the term for simplicity of expression.' If the community property
regime terminates because of a judgment of separation of property9' or a
judgment approving a matrimonial agreement terminating the regime, 92 the coowners of former community property are still spouses. Furthermore, to repeat
in each article "former community property" and "former spouse" is cumbersome
and seemingly repetitious. Formercommunity property serves as a reminder that
the community property regime has terminated.

87. See discussion supra part I.B.
88. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.8 (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 443, § 1). The second paragraph
of Article 2369.8 recognizes the possibility that the spouses may partition former community property
extrajudicially under La. Civ. Code art. 809 (rev. 1990) by the language "[ilf the spouses are unable

to agree on the partition." If they are unable to agree on the partition, then "either spouse may
demand a judicial partition which shall be conducted in accordance with IS. 9:2801." Therefore,
even though the other method of partition referred to in La. Civ. Code art. 809 (rev. 1990) is
available to the spouses, it is not to be conducted in accordance with the rules providing for judicial
partition among ordinary co-owners. See La. Civ. Code arts. 810-813 (rev. 1990). See also La. Civ.
Code art. 2369.8 cmt. b (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 443, § 1).
89. See discussion in Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 8, § 7.29. See also discussion supra part
ll.A.3.
90. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.1 cmt. d (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 443, § 1).
91. La. Civ. Code arts. 2374-2376 (rev. 1993).
92. La. Civ. Code arts. 2329, 2356 (rev. 1979, 1990).
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B. Article 2369.2. Ownership Interest
Each spouse owns an undivided one-half interest informer community
property and its fruits andproducts.

1. Owns an Undivided Interest
Article 797 of the Civil Code declares that "[i]n the absence of other
provisions of the law or juridical act, the shares of all co-owners are presumed
to be equal." As "other provision of the law," Article 2369.2 modifies this
general principle of co-ownership by declaring that each spouse owns" an
undivided" one-half interest in former community property. To emphasize the
continuation ofownership ofequal shares of community property, Article 2369.2
uses the word "interest" instead of "share." Article 2336, which applies during
the existence of the community property regime, states that "[e]ach spouse owns
a present undivided one-half interest in the community property." 5 Thus, the
new article signals a departure from general principles of co-ownership by its
choice of interestnot share,a reference to the law of community property rather
than purely the law of co-ownership.
In addition, substitution of the concept of ownership for a mere presumption
of equal shares signals the departure from the general principles of co-ownership." As a matter of law, rather than by presumption, each spouse owns an
undivided one-half interest in former community property. The significance of
the departure is that a presumption is rebuttable by evidence that equality of
interests was not intended by the spouses or is not fair or equitable under the
circumstances. The language of the new article assures that principles such as
the equitable distribution of community property9 7 are not judicially imported
into our law.
Nonetheless, despite the arguably categorical statement of Article 2369.2, the
comments mention the possibility that the interests of the spouses may vary if
the spouses, rather than the judge, adopted by matrimonial agreement a

93. Ownership means "the right that confers on a person direct, immediate, and exclusive
authority over a thing" (La. Civ. Code art. 477 (rev. 1979)), just as it does in La. Civ. Code art. 797
(rev. 1990). See Symeonides & Martin, supra note 15, at 72, 80-84.
94. "Ownership of the same thing by two or more persons is ownership in indivision." La. Civ.
Code art. 797 (rev. 1990) (emphasis added). See Symeonides &Martin, supra note 15, at 72, 81-84.
95. La. Civ. Code art. 2336 (rev. 1982) (emphasis added).
96. See discussion of the presumption as between co-owners and as to third parties in
Symeonides &Martin, supra note 15, at 72, 84-91.
97. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §25-318(A) (1991); Idaho Code § 32-712 (1995); Nev. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 125.150(1)(bX2) (1991); Tex. Fain. Code Ann. § 3.63 (1993); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §
26.09.080 (Supp. 1995).
98. La. Civ. Code arts. 2328-2330 (rev. 1979).
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conventional community property regime that altered the fractional ownership."
This conclusion follows from the obvious intention of the Article that ownership
of community property continues in the fractions established during the existence
of the regime by law or by matrimonial agreement. Furthermore, the equal
fractional ownership of community property"° is not considered to be a matter
of public order'"' and thus may be altered by matrimonial agreement.'0 2
Article 2369.2 should similarly be interpreted. Article 797 regulating coownership generally provides further support for so concluding since the
presumption of equal shares applies "[iun the absence of... juridicalact...
which surely includes a matrimonial agreement.
2. Fruitsand Products
Article 2369.2 also provides for equal ownership of the fruits and products0 3 of former community property. The language of this Article is a
departure from Article 798. Like ownership of former community property
itself, the equality of the respective interests of each spouse in fruits and
products"° is not dependent upon the rebuttable presumption of Article 797.

99. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.2 cmt. b (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 443, § 1): "Ifthe spouses
have adopted a community regime by matrimonial agreement that alters the fractional ownership
interests of the spouses in community property, that same interest will be maintained after termination
under the authority of Civil Code Articles 797 and 798. See C.C. Art. 2330 (rev. 1979), comment
(d)."
100. La. Civ. Code art. 2336 (rev. 1982).
101. La. Civ. Code art. 2329 (rev. 1979) permits spouses to enter into a matrimonial agreement
as to all matters "not prohibited by public policy." Despite La. Civ. Code art. 2336 cmt. b (rev.
1982), La. Civ. Code art. 2330 cmt. d (see infra note 102) specifically recognizes a matrimonial
agreement that alters the fractional ownership of the spouses.
Article 2336 is the article that declares that each spouse owns a present undivided one-half interest
in community property, but it also prohibits the judicial partition of community property prior to
termination of the regime. Thus, it is logical to conclude when reading La. Civ. Code art. 2336 cmt.
b with La. Civ. Code art. 2330 cmt. d in pari materia (even though the comments are not law) that
the portion of Article 2336 which is a matter of public order is that sentence that prohibits the
judicial partition of community property prior to termination of the regime. The public clearly has
an interest in reducing the types of lawsuits between husband and wife and prohibiting the spouses
from contracting otherwise. See also La. R.S. 9:291 (1990).
102. La. Civ. Code art. 2330 cmt. d (rev. 1979) (emphasis added):
However, this provision does not deprive the spouses of flexibility in determining the
ownership and management of their property. For example, the spouses may by
matrimonial agreement provide for contribution to the expenses of the marriage, for
apportionmentofcommunitypropertyaccordingto fixedshares, or for the reservation of
fruits as separate property.
103. La. Civ. Code art. 483 (rev. 1979): "In the absence of rights of other persons, the owner
of a thing acquires the ownership of its natural and civil fruits."
La. Civ. Code art. 488 (rev. 1979): "Products derived from a thing as a result of diminution of
its substance belong to the owner of that thing."
104. See supra text accompanying notes 93-102.
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A spouse may assert the claim to an equal portion of the fruits and products in
the partition action."°5
Fruits,the comments explain,"° is a term defined as "things produced by
or derived from another thing without diminution of its substance"; ° whereas,
products are "derived from a thing as a result of diminution of its substance.... .'"
The two terms have the same meaning in this Article and in
Article 798,'0' governing an ordinary co-owner's rights to claim fruits and
products.
3. Article 798, Second ParagraphApplies
In their article on the new law of co-ownership, Professor Symeonides and
Mrs. Martin speculate as to "whether this right [to share in the fruits and
products under Article 798] should be classified as a real right to the fruits or
products or as a personal right against the other co-owners."'' 0 The authors
distinguish between the first paragraph of Article 798 that uses the verb
share"' and the second paragraph that uses the verb phrase "are entitled
to. "' 2 If the first paragraph applies because the fruits and products are not
produced by one co-owner," 3 then "each co-owner retains, at all times, a direct

105. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.2 cmt. d (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1): "The claim
by the producing spouse is properly assertable in an action ofpartition under R.S. 9:2801." La. R.S.
9:2801 (1995) (emphasis added) was amended at the same time by the same act to provide for the
assertion of claims by one co-owner spouse against the other: "Whenthe spouses are unable to agree
on a partition of community property or on the settlement of the claims between the spouses arising
either from the matrimonial regime, or from the co-ownership of former community property

following termination of the matrimonial regime."
106. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.2 cmt. c: "In keeping with Civil Code Articles 2338 (rev. 1979)
and 798 (rev. 1990), this Article also provides that a spouse owns an undivided one-half interest in
the fruits and products of former community property. For a definition of fruits and products, see
Civil Code Articles 551 (rev. 1976), 488 (rev. 1979), and 2339 (rev. 1979)."
107. La. Civ. Code art. 551 (rev. 1979).
108. La. Civ. Code art. 488 (rev. 1979).
109. For detailed discussion of the two terms' meanings within the context of the law of coownership, including differentiating between fruits and products, see Symeonides & Martin, supra
note 15, at 91-93, 95-97.
110. Symeonides & Martin, supra note 15, at 72, 93.
111. La. Civ. Code art. 798 (rev. 1990): "Co-owners share the fruits and products of the thing
held in indivision in proportion to their ownership."
112. Id.: "When fruits and products are produced by a co-owner, other co-owners are entitled
to their shares of the fruits or products after deduction of the costs of production."
113. The first category [first paragraph of Article 798] encompasses cases in which the
fruits or products are produced by the labor of all co-owners acting jointly under either
Article 801 or the authority of the court pursuant to Article 803, as well as cases in which
the fruits are produced spontaneously by the thing without the labor of any one of the coowners in particular.
Symeonides &Martin, supra note 15, at 94.
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and immediate right in the fruits or products, that is, he has a real right in
them.""' 4 By contrast, if the second paragraph applies because the fruits and
products have been produced by one of the co-owners, "the producing co-owner
owns all 'fruits and products... produced by [him]' while the other co-owners
merely have a personal right to claim from him their respective shares.'"" A
real right to or ownership of the fruits and products means that the interest ofthe
co-owner is a part of his patrimony that can be alienated or encumbered by him
or can be seized by his creditors." 6 In commenting upon the result of such a
construction, the authors state: "Such a reading of the second paragraph of
Article 798, particularly with regard to products, should be avoided, since it
would make the other co-owners' rights dependent on the mercy or the solvency
of the producing co-owner ....
[T]hese modifications [of a co-owner's
ownership] should never reach the point of eviscerating the very core of coownership.""' 7 The observation is even more compelling in the case of coownership of former community property when hostility between former spouses,
for example, may encourage irresponsible behavior.
By failing to modify the second paragraph of Article 798' the Legislature
has denied to the spouse co-owner who produces the fruits and products the right
to recover "reimbursement for the value of his services or labor in producing
fruits or products."" 9 What the Legislature grants with one hand, a real right
to all the fruits and products produced by the co-owner, it takes away with the
other, reimbursement for value of services or labor in producing fruits and
products. To illustrate the application of the second paragraph of Article 2369.2,
consider Dugas v. Dugas 2 ° The wife demanded an "accounting" from the
husband for one-half of the net profit from one year's sugar cane crop. The
husband, who had produced the crop, sought to deduct a sum for his time and
effort in producing and harvesting the crop in addition to other legitimate farm
expenses.'
The court awarded the husband $24,000 representing the reasonable compensation for his labor, permitting him to deduct that sum from gross
profits as a farm expense. Under this Article and the unmodified second
paragraph of Article 798, the salary attributable to the labor of the co-owner/husband could not be deducted as a production expense. He would instead
have to urge a quasi-contractual claim for the value of his services either in

114. Id.
115. Id.
116. La. Civ. Code art. 3183 (1870).
117. Symeonides & Martin, supra note 15, at 95.
118. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.2 cmt. a (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 443, § 1): "This Article
restates in part the rules provided in Civil Code Article 797 (rev. 1990) and the first Paragraph of
Civil Code Article 798 (rev. 1990) for ordinary owners."
119. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.2 cmt. d (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 443, § 1).
120. 544 So. 2d 111 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989).
121. Such farm expenses might include chemicals, fertilizer, fuel, loans incurred for planting the
seed cane, and labor by third parties. 544 So. 2d at 114.

1996]

FORMER COMMUNITY PROPERTY

unjust enrichment," 2 as the comment to Article 798 suggests,' 3 or in negotiorum gestio'24 if both of the remedies are not excluded by the provisions of the
article itself."2 Even if the remedy is not precluded by Article 798, proof of
the elements for recovery in quasi-contract are difficult.
C. Article 2369.3. Duty to Preserve; Standardof Care
A spouse has a duty to preserve and to manageprudentlyformer
community property under his control, including aformer community
enterprise, in a manner consistent with the mode ofuse of thatproperty

122. See La. Civ. Code art. 2298 (as amended by 1995 La. Acts No. 1041, § 1).
123. "A co-owner does not have the right to claim compensation for his own labor or services.
Nevertheless, he may be entitled to such compensation under the law of unjust enrichment." La. Civ.
Code art. 798 cmt. c (rev. 1990).
124. La. Civ. Code arts. 2292-2297 (as amended by 1995 La. Acts No. 1041, § 1). "There is
a management of affairs when a person, the manager, acts without authority to protect the interests
of another, the owner, in the reasonable belief that the owner would approve of the action if made
aware of the circumstances." La. Civ. Code art. 2292; see also La. Civ. Code art. 2292 cmt. a.
125. A convincing argument may be made that the general principles of unjust enrichment
or negotiorum gestio do not apply when there is a specific article governing the rights and
responsibilities ofa co-owner, since the articles on co-ownership are the more specific and
thus should prevail over the more general. It is only if there is no specific provision of
the co-ownership law governing a situation that the rules of quasi-contract may apply.
The comment to La. Civ. Code art. 800 (eff. Jan. 1, 1991) supports this conclusion: "This
provision is new. It expresses the principle that necessary steps for the preservation of
the thing held in indivision may be taken by any of the co-owners acting alone. This is
not unauthorized management of the affairs of another under Civil Code Article 2295

(1870) ....
"
Spaht, Developments 1989-1990, supra note 16, at 329-30 n.60.
But see Symeonides & Martin, supra note 15, at 72, 99:
Because it is contained in the comments rather than in the text of the Article, this
statement would be meaningless were the Article to contain any provision to the contrary
or any language that could be construed as displacing the residual law of unjust
enrichment. Fortunately, Article 798 does not contain any such language. It does not say,
for instance, that the producing co-owner is entitled to the costs of production only. Thus,
the door remains open for resorting to the residual law of unjust enrichment.
Subsequently, the authors of the Tulane Law Review article do admit that unjust enrichment is a
subsidiary cause of action and only if the law provides no other remedy will it be available. Id. at
100-01. Another remedy the law expressly recognizes is negotiorum gestio, and the two actions are
distinct. See La. Civ. Code arts. 2292-2297 (as amended by 1995 La. Acts No. 1041, § 1), in
particular Article 2292 cmt. e. The gestoris entitled to recover his "necessary and useful expenses."
La. Civ. Code art. 2297 (as amended by 1995 La. Acts No. 1041, § 1). "[The next question is
whether labor expenses incurred in the production offruits qualify as 'useful and necessary expenses'
for which reimbursement is available to gestors under Article 2299 [now Article 2297]. While
doctrine and jurisprudence suggest a negative answer, they also permit an affirmative answer in
special circumstances." Symeonides & Martin, supra note 15, at 100-01. See Alain A. Levasseur,
Louisiana Law of Unjust Enrichment in Quasi-Contracts 370-427 (1991).
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immediately prior to termination of the community regime. He is
answerablefor any damage caused by hisfault, default, or neglect.
A community enterpriseis a business that is not a legal entity.
1. Duty to Preserve
This Article imposes an affirmative duty to preserve former community
property under a spouse's control. The duty to preserve of a co-owner/spouse
contrasts with the rightto preserve of an ordinary co-owner.'2 6 To the extent that
a spouse has former community property under his control, 7 he has a duty to
preserve it; and as to other former community property, he has a right to preserve
the property.'
The duty to preserve encompasses preventing destruction,
damage or loss of the thing,2 9 but not preventing alteration of the thing. 3 The
language of this Article supports this conclusion about the scope of the duty to
preserve. Under this Article, the duty to preserve is qualified by the phrase, "in a
manner consistent with the mode of use'3' of that property immediately prior to
termination ofthe community regime." Whether a spouse has complied with the
duty to preserve former community property should be judged by an objective
standard of prudence' as modified by this article,'33 just as the duty to manage
is judged.
The new legislation, just as the law of co-ownership, 34 recognizes the
tripartite distinction between acts of preservation imposed as a duty in this Article
and acts of management' 35 and disposition. 36 The new legislation does not

126. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.3 cmt. a (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1): "In contrast,
Civil Code Article 800 (rev. 1990), applicable to ordinary co-owners, provides for a right but not a
duty to act for the preservation of the property. Such a duty arises only if the co-owner undertakes
to act as a negotiorum gestor or he is appointed as administrator. See Symeonides & Martin, The
New Law of Co-ownership: A Kommentar, 68 Tul. L. Rev. 701, 746 (1993)."
127. The meaning ofthis phrase is the same as its meaning in La. Civ. Code art. 2369 (rev. 1979).
128. La. Civ. Code art. 800 (rev. 1979): "A co-owner may without the concurrence of any other
co-owner take necessary steps for the preservation of the thing that is held in indivision."
129. A.N. Yiannopoulos, Personal Servitudes § 87, at 177, in 3 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
(3d ed. 1989).
130.

Symeonides & Martin, supra note 15, at 114.

131. See infra text accompanying notes 176-179.
132. Symeonides & Martin, supra note 15, at 114: "The necessity ofthe measures (for anordinary
co-owner under Article 800], as well as their sufficiency and proportionality, should be judged
objectively by the prudent man standard, rather than by the subjective standard of the acting co-owner."

133. "[Iun a manner consistent with the mode of use of that property immediately prior to
termination of the community regime .... La. Civ. Code art. 2369.3 (as added by 1995 La. Acts

No. 433, § 1).
134. Symeonides &Martin, supra note 15, at 113- 14. See also La. Civ. Code art. 800 (rev. 1990).
135. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.3 (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1), as modified for former
community property under a spouse's control. See La. Civ. Code arts. 801, 803 (rev. 1990) for
former community property not under a spouse's control and subject to the application of the general
law of co-ownership.
136. La. Civ. Code arts. 2369.4-2369.7 (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1).
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directly address "use" as does the law ofco-ownership, so initially an argument can
be made that the general law ofco-ownership governs "use." Under Article 802 the
general rule is that a co-owner has the right to use the thing co-owned according to
its destination "7 but may not prevent the other co-owner from making such use
of it, unless the use and management is determined by agreement of the coowners. 138 The comments to Article 802 do, however, recognize that the use of
the family residence and community movables and immovables may be the subject
of a court order granting to one co-owner/spouse exclusive use 139 even though
partition may
be available, which is a condition to such a court order for ordinary
14
co-owners.

0

A strong argument can be made that exclusive use of former community
property under a spouse's control, including the right to prevent use by the other coowner, may be implicitly conferred by the imposition of a duty to preserve (and to
manage) such property. Otherwise, a spouse without control of former community
property but the right to use the property as an ordinary co-owner could seriously
affect the ability ofthe other spouse to comply with his or her duty to preserve. Of
course, if the co-owner/spouse insisted upon exercising his right to use, and use
implies some measure of control, then the same co-owner/spouse would himself
assume the duty to preserve, in conjunction with'4 ' or independent of, 142 the
other spouse. The danger of such an interpretation is that if control does not
necessarily follow use then a co-owner/spouse who may enjoy the use but has no
control incurs no obligation to preserve the property. Likewise, the co-owner/spouse with control but who either has no use or is required to share the use has
the exclusive obligation to preserve the property.
If a co-owner/spouse has control of the property and thus the duty to preserve
it, it seems logical to confer upon him exclusive use as a means ofpermitting him
to perform his duty. Ifa co-owner/spouse chooses to relinquish control over former
community property or neither co-owner/spouse has control over such property,

137. La. Civ. Code art. 802 (rev. 1990): "Except as otherwise provided in Article 801
[agreement of the parties], a co-owner is entitled to use the thing held in indivision according to its
destination, but he cannot prevent another co-owner from making such use of it."
138. La. Civ. Code art. 801 (rev. 1990): "The use and management of the thing held in
indivision is determined by agreement of all the co-owners."
139. La. R.S. 9:374 A-B (1991 & Supp. 1996).
140. La. Civ. Code art. 803 (rev. 1990): "When the mode of use and management of the thing
held in indivision is not determined by an agreement of all the co-owners and partition is not
available, a court, upon petition by a co-owner, may determine the use and management"
See Symeonides & Martin, supra note 15, at 131-32, for a discussion of the limiting feature of

judicial intervention, "partition is not available."
141.
implies
142.
control,

If the co-owned thing to be used can be used by both co-owners simultaneously and use
control, then both would be subject to the duty to preserve.
If the co-owned thing can only be used by one co-owner at any given time and use implies
then the co-owner who has use has the duty to preserve the thing. If the other co-owner first

had control and use, the second co-owner who now has control and use is obligated to preserve the
property. The obligation of the second co-owner displaces the obligation to preserve former
community property imposed upon the first co-owner.
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then the general rules ofco-ownership apply, and either co-owner/spouse could use
the property and act to preserve it.
2. Duty to ManagePrudently
Just as with the duty to preserve, the duty to manage prudently departs from
the general principles ofco-ownership law by imposing explicitly an affirmative
duty to manage prudently, or "duty to act in a prophylactic manner."' 43 The coownership articles "do not impose on one co-owner an affirmative duty to manage
the co-owned thing unless that owner assumed the qualities of a gestor or was
appointed as an administrator."'"
The imposition ofan affirmative duty to manage prudentlyunder this Article
is reinforced by the following sentence: "He is answerable for any damage caused
by his fault, default, or neglect."' 45 The sentence is virtually identical to Article
576'" imposing upon the usufructuary a standard of care that the comment
describes as that ofa "prudent administrator."' 47 Prudently appears already in the
first sentence of this Article and combined with the second sentence clearly
imposes a standard of care equivalent to that of the "prudent administrator.'"
"Fault, default, or neglect" includes, according to the comment to Article 576,
slight fault,'49 "namely, he must exercise the diligence that an attentive and
careful man exercises in the management of his own affairs."' 5 °

143. Symeonides & Martin, supra note 15, at 107.
144. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.3 cmt. a (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1). See also
Symeonides & Martin, supra note 15, at 107-12.
Compare the principles of ordinary co-ownership law. La. Civ. Code art. 801 (rev. 1990) provides
that the management of thing is determined by agreement of all the co-owners; and La. Civ. Code
art. 803 (rev. 1990) provides that, in the absence of agreement and when partition is not available,
the court may determine the management of the co-owned thing. La. Civ. Code art. 799 (rev. 1990)
imposes liability upon a co-owner/spouse for damage to the thing held in indivision caused by his
fault. See Symeonides & Martin, supra note 15, at 101-12 (discussion of Article 799).
145. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.3 (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1).
146. "The usufructuary is answerable for losses resulting from his fraud, default, or neglect."
La. Civ. Code art. 576 (rev. 1976).
147. "The expressions 'prudent owner' and 'prudent administrator' in the Louisiana Civil Code
of 1870, and the corresponding bon pere defamille in the French Civil Code, reflect the notion of
homo diligens et studiosus paterfamilias of the Roman law." La. Civ. Code art. 576 cmt. b (rev.
1976).
148. See La. Civ. Code art. 576 cmt. c (rev. 1976) (cases and jurisprudence cited therein).
See also La. Civ. Code art. 2295 (as amended by 1995 La. Acts No. 1041, § 1): "The manager
[negotiorumgestio] must exercise the care of a prudent administrator and is answerable for any loss
that results from his failure to do so."
149. La. Civ. Code art. 3506(13): "The slight fault is that want ofcare which aprudent man usually
takes of his business."
But see La. Civ. Code art. 2295 cmt. c (imposing the duty of a "prudent administrator" upon the
manager of the affairs ofanother): "The manager may also be liable under the law governing delictual
obligations for his fraud, fault, or neglect, but not for slight fault. See C.C. Arts. 2315 and 3506 (13)."
150. La. Civ. Code art. 576 cmt. b (rev. 1976).
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Arguably, the affirmative duty to manage prudently imposes a higher standard
of care upon a co-owner/spouse than that imposed upon ordinary co-owners.5 1
Because of the failure to impose upon an ordinary co-owner an affirmative duty to
preserve or to manage,' 52 the lower prudent man standard, rather than the prudent
administratorstandard, applies to an ordinary co-owner. To be subject to the more
rigorous prudent administrator standard, an ordinary co-owner must administer or
manage co-owned property that could be damaged by hisfault."3 This Article,
by contrast, imposes an affirmative duty to manage and to do so prudently.
Furthermore, the prudent management standard under this article is explicitly linked
to the mode of use of the property immediately prior to termination of the
community regime. The more particularized the standard the easier to measure the
actions ofthe co-owner spouse against that standard to determine whether he was
prudent.
Clearly, the obligation of a co-owner/spouse to manage prudently former
community property exceeds any obligation imposed upon a spouse during the
existence of the community regime. During the regime, the spouse is only liable
54
for "fraud or bad faith" in the management of community property.
The reason for imposing a higher standard of care in managing former
community property is that, after termination of the community property
regime, the law no longer assumes that a spouse who has former
community property under his control will act in the best interest ofboth
spouses in managing it.' 55
Management traditionally includes acts of administration that exceed mere
acts to preserve but do not divest the owner of his interest or "deprive him in
part or inwhole, of a real or personal right."' 56 Acts of preservation are not
included within the term because the duty to preserve is mentioned specifically
with the duty to manage in this Article. Under the traditional tripartite division

151. "Second, this Article imposes a higher standard of care than that provided by Civil Code
Article 799 (rev. 1990) for ordinary co-owners." La. Civ. Code art. 2369.3 cmt. a (as added by 1995
La. Acts No. 433, § 1).
152. For conflicting opinions about the standard of care for ordinary co-owners, see Spaht,
Developments 1989-1990, supra note 16;and Symeonides & Martin, supra note 15, at 106-12.
153. "However, when the co-owner is not administering the co-owned property, the prudent man
standard that is applicable is lower than the prudent administrator standard in that the latter standard
includes affirmative duties and the former does not." Symeonides & Martin, supra note 15, at 112.
See also id.
at 107-12.
154. La. Civ. Code art. 2354 (rev. 1979): "A spouse is liable for any loss or damage caused by
fraud or bad faith in the management of the community property."
155. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.3 cmt. a (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1).
156. Symeonides & Martin, supra note 15, at 113 (quoting from Yiannopoulos, supra note 129,
§ 87, at 177).
Examples in the footnote in the article by Symeonides & Martin include "sales, exchanges,
donations that are translative of ownership, the burdening of ownership with a real right, and the
compromise of a claim." Id. at n.219.
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of acts,' 7 which is used in allocating powers, management is the residual
category."' As a general proposition, manage in this Article includes alienate,
encumber, or lease to the extent that the articles that follow do not provide
specific rules for acts of disposition because the Article is not delineating power
but imposing a duty and standard of care. Thus, management under this Article
can include alienation, encumbrance or lease in instances where one coowner/spouse has the authority to act without the concurrence of the other." 9
There are three such instances in the Articles that follow: movables issued or
registered in the name of one spouse," ° movables of a former community
enterprise in the regular course of business, 6' and judicial authorization to act
alone without the concurrence of the other spouse. 62
Arguably, there is a distinction in scope of liability between a co-owner/spouse under this Article and a usufructuary under Article 576:163 the coowner/spouse is liable for damages and the usufructuary for losses. Damages
incorporates two elements of loss-loss sustained and the profit of which the
claimant has been deprived.'" Thus, a failure to prudently manage former
community property (i.e. neglect) that results in damage suffered in the nature
of a lost profit is actionable. 6
The extent to which the duty to manage prudently former community
property under a spouse's control affects use is discussed above in II.C. 1.
3. Comparison to Article 2369's Duty to Account
A spouse's duty to account for former community property under his control
at termination of the regime has always been misunderstood. Obviously, a
comparison of the language of Article 2369' 66 and this one indicates some
overlap. Article 2369 focuses on a moment in time when a spouse may have
control over community property, and that moment is termination ofthe community
property regime. As to that property under a spouse's control at termination of the
community regime, the spouse must "explain what happened to the property that

157. Symeonides & Martin, supra note 15 at 113 (quoting from Yiannopoulous, supra note 129,
§ 87, at 177).
158.

Id.

159.

For similar treatment of this issue during the existence of the community property regime,

see La. Civ. Code art. 2354 (rev. 1979) (management includes alienation, encumbrance, or lease).

160. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.5 (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1).
La. Civ. Code art. 2369.6 (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1).
161.
162. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.7 (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1).
163. Interestingly, the liability of an ordinary co-owner is for damage, not loss, to the thing
caused by his fault. La. Civ. Code art. 799 (rev. 1990).
164. La. Civ. Code art. 1995 (rev. 1984).
165. See, e.g., Queenan v. Queenan, 492 So. 2d 902 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 496 So. 2d
1045 (1986).
166. "A spouse owes an accounting to the other spouse for community property under his
control at the termination of the community property regime." La. Civ. Code art. 2369 (rev. 1979).
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was then under his control.' 67 "To invoke that duty a spouse need prove only
that the other spouse had control of former community property at the moment of
termination of the regime,"' 68 and then the burden shifts to the other spouse to
prove what happened to the property. The claim is subject to a short three-year
prescriptive period.
"By contrast, the duty to preserve and manage former community property
under one spouse's control imposed by this Article arises at the moment of
termination ofthe community regime and continues until a partition ofthe former
community property occurs."" 9 In addition, a claim for breach of the duty
requires proof that the spouse "failed to act prudently in a manner consistent with
the mode ofuse ofthe property immediately prior to termination ofthe regime, not
simply that he had former community property under his7 control." o The claim
is subject to a much longer ten-year prescriptive period.' 1
4. Definition of Community Enterprise
The duty to preserve and to manage prudently extends to a "community
enterprise."'7
The Article addresses the community enterprise explicitly to

assure retention ofthe unique character attributed to it under matrimonial regimes
law. The community enterprise is a business that is not a legal entity,' " thus
neither a corporation nor partnership.
The business is thus treated as "a
collective of things," as ifan entity, for purposes of matrimonial regimes law.
Despite its accepted meaning, this Article defines community enterprisein the
second paragraph out ofan abundance of caution, rather than
simply relying on a
7
comment to Article 2347 containing the same definition.1
This Article maintains the unique treatment of a community enterprise after
termination of the community regime so that "the business" collectively is
protected by the affirmative duty to preserve and to manage prudently. The
community enterprise may well be the most valuable property owned as former
community property, and the duties imposed by this Article extend to the
business as a whole.

167.
168.
169.

La. Civ. Code art. 2369.3 cmt. c (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1).
Id.
Id.

170.

Id.

171. La. Civ. Code art. 3499 (rev. 1983). See also La. Civ. Code art. 2369.3 cmt. c (as added
by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1)
172. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.3 (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1) (emphasis added): "A
spouse has a duty to preserve and to manage prudently former community property under his control,
includinga former communityenterprise."

173. La. Civ. Code art. 24 (rev. 1987): "A juridical person is an entity to which the law
attributes personality, such as a corporation or a partnership."
174. Id.
175.

La. Civ. Code art. 2347 cmt. b (rev. 1979).
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5. In a Manner Consistent With the Mode of Use

This prepositional phrase was attached to the duty to preserve and to manage
prudently in an attempt to particularize the standard of care of a co-owner/spouse.'76 Particularizing the prudent administrator standard is especially
important for the duty to manage. A duty to preserve former community
property under a spouse's control requires less explanation.
Mode of use appears in Louisiana Civil Code article 803 which concerns the
use and management of the co-owned thing in the absence of agreement.'7
The phrase in Article 2369.3 refers to the use of the property immediately prior
to termination of the community regime. 77 The obligation to manage prudently former community property under a spouse's control depends upon that use.
As a consequence, if former community property under a spouse's control had
been unimproved, undeveloped immovable property-for example acreage in the
country-the co-owner/spouse would have no obligation to make that property
productive by growing crops or by harvesting timber on property that is not
timberlands.' 79
6. Immediately Priorto Termination of Community Regime
In an attempt to further particularize the standard of care of a co-owner/spouse and to narrow its scope, this Article focuses on the mode of use of the
property immediately prior to termination of the community property regime.
The selected time, by contrast to Article 2369, which concerns the duty to
account, is not an exact moment nor is it the termination of the regime.
Nonetheless, it limits the time period to be considered to one that immediately
precedes the event that creates the co-ownership relationship.
Immediately priorto gives the judge some flexibility, but not too much, in
imposing a duty under this Article. If the Article had focused on the exact
moment of termination of the regime as the duty to account does, a coowner/spouse could manipulate the use of the property in anticipation of
termination of the regime so as to avoid any duty imposed by this Article. On
the other hand, it would be unreasonable to require a co-owner/spouse to manage
prudently immovable property in a manner consistent with its use a long time
176. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.3 (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1).
177. La. Civ. Code art. 803 (rev. 1990): "When the mode of use and management of the thing
held in indivision is not determined by an agreement of all the co-owners and partition is not
available, a court, upon petition by a co-owner, may determine the use and management."
178. See Symeonides & Martin, supra note 15, at 130-33 (discussion of "mode of use" in the
context of La. Civ. Code art. 803 (rev. 1990)).
179. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.3 cmt. d (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1): "To preserve
and manage former community property in accordance with its mode of use immediately prior to
termination of the community regime does not require a spouse with such property under his control
to make previously unproductive property productive." See also La. Civ. Code art. 562 (rev. 1976)
(usufruct of timberlands).

1996]

FORMER COMMUNITY PROPERTY

distant from the event that terminates the regime. Consider the case of
community immovable property devoted to growing timber twenty years ago
during the existence of the community regime. Assume that ten years ago the
timber was clear-cut. The co-owner/spouse who controls that immovable
property should not be required to plant, grow and harvest timber on the property
in an effort to comply with his duty to manage prudently.
7. Expenses Incurredto Comply With Obligation Comparedto Those
OtherwiseIncurred
If a co-owner/spouse is required to expend money to comply with his duty
to preserve or to manage prudently, the Articles on ordinary co-ownership should
govern his right to recover from the other spouse.'80 Because expenditures
may be required to preserve former community property or to manage it
prudently, the expenditures arguably are necessary.' ' If expenditures are
necessary expenses, the co-owner/spouse who made them is entitled to
reimbursement of one-half the amount from the other spouse. 2 The comment
to this Article is in accord. 8 3
The right to reimbursement for expenses should differ, however, if a coowner/spouse does NOT have control of former community property; the spouse
has no duty to preserve or manage prudently. A co-owner/spouse without
control of former community is governed by rules ofco-ownership under Article
806. He must prove that the expenses are the type for which recovery is granted
to an ordinary co-owner: necessary, for ordinary maintenance or repairs, or for
necessary management performed by a third person.
If any expenditure is authorized under the provisions of Article 806, the coowner/spouse's reimbursement for such expenditure must be reduced "in

180. See McMorris v. McMorris, 654 So. 2d 742, 748 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1995).
[T]he ex-husband may not be entitled to recover from the ex-wife a full-half of the...
insurance, ... maintenance costs, and... taxes on that home. C.C. Art. 806 gives, to
a co-owner who incurs necessary expenses, maintenance and repairs, reimbursement from
the other co-owners in proportion to their shares. Art. 806 adds, however, that if the coowner had the enjoyment of the thing held in indivision, his reimbursement shall be
reduced in proportion to the value of the enjoyment.
181. La. Civ. Code art. 806 (rev. 1990) (emphasis added): "A co-owner who on account of the
thing held in indivision has incurred necessary expenses, expenses for ordinary maintenance and
repairs, or necessary management expenses paid to a third person, is entitled to reimbursement from
the other co-owners in proportion to their shares."
182. Even if the expenditures were not deemed necessary, the co-owner/spouse would be

permitted to recover for ordinary maintenance and repairs (duty to preserve) and necessary
management expenses paid to third persons, but not other management expenses.
183. "A spouse who incurs expenses in compliance with the obligation imposed by this Article
is entitled to reimbursement for one-half the costs in accordance with general principles of the law

of co-ownership. C.C. Art. 806 (rev. 1990)." La. Civ. Code art. 2369.3 cmt. f(as added by 1995 La.
Acts No. 433, § 1).
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proportion to the value of the enjoyment."''
The reduction of the value of
enjoyment has particular implications for spouses who are co-owners of former
community property. For example, a co-owner/spouse who makes "necessary"
expenditures to comply with his duty to preserve and to manage prudently and
claims reimbursement can expect an offsetting claim for rental value from the
other co-owner spouse. Such an offsetting claim is typical if the former
community property is the family home and has been occupied by the spouse
who made the expenditure and is asserting a reimbursement claim.
As acknowledged by a comment to Article 802, which pertains to the right
to use a co-owned thing,' 85 there may be a court order granting to one coowner/spouse the exclusive use of the co-owned thing if it is former community
property,"' or, in more limited instances, separate property of the other
spouse." 7 The statute that authorizes a court order of exclusive use contains
a paragraph that relieves the co-owner spouse who uses or who obtains a court
order of exclusive use of the family residence from liability to the other spouse
for rental for the use and occupancy, "unless otherwise agreed by the spouses or
ordered by the court.""' This paragraph of the statute has been the subject of
numerous decisions interpreting its language, in particular "unless otherwise...
ordered by the court."" 9 Because the statute is so specific and pertains only
to former community property not other types of co-owned property, the statute
should prevail over the general principle of co-ownership law that permits a
reduction for the value of enjoyment in all cases.
Most of the decisions interpreting the statute concern claims for "reimbursement" under matrimonial regimes law"9° for the use of separate property to satisfy
a "community" obligation, rather than co-ownership law. The "community"
obligation is typically a mortgage indebtedness that has been paid with separate
earnings after termination ofthe community regime. Because the jurisprudence has
always treated obligations incurred during the regime but satisfied after its
termination as a matter of reimbursement under matrimonial regimes law, 9 ' it
is appropriate to continue to apply those principles to pre-termination obligations.
There is no parallel in the law of co-ownership for the right of one co-owner to
recover against another for the satisfaction of an obligation incurred before coownership began. Expenditures to satisfy pre-termination obligations should be

184. La. Civ. Code art. 806 (rev. 1990): "If the co-owner who incurred the expenses had the
enjoyment of the thing held in indivision, his reimbursement shall be reduced in proportion to the
value of the enjoyment."
185. La. Civ. Code art. 802 cmt. b (rev. 1990): "For the use of the family residence and of
community movables and immovables after the filing of a petition for separation of [sic] divorce, see
R.S. 9:308 (9:374]."
186. La. R.S. 9:374(B) (1991).
187. Id. at (A).
188. Id. at (C).
189. See Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 8, § 7.14, at 289.
190. La. Civ. Code art. 2365 (rev. 1990).
191.
Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 8, § 7.14, at 289.
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subject to provisions different from expenditures to preserve or to manage the
property after co-ownership begins, and those duties are imposed for the first time.
When the pre-termination obligation was incurred (during the community regime),
the law made a different assumption about the nature of the relationship of the two
spouses. As a consequence, it seems reasonable to subject those expenditures to a
different set of rules, different from rules for expenditures made between the
termination of the regime and partition.
To summarize, for an expenditure to satisfy an obligation incurred during the
existence of the community regime, the rules of reimbursement under Articles
2358-2368 seem appropriate andjust. However, expenditures made for obligations
incurred after termination of the community regime should be governed by Article
806. Even though necessary expenses incurred after termination ofthe regime are
different from expenditures incurred during the existence of the community
regime,' 92 the more specific statute, Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:374, should
prevail over the second paragraph of Article 806 which requires reduction of the
value of enjoyment. Thus, Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:374 arguably applies to
both types of expenditures when the former community property is the family
residence.
Consider the application of this Article and Article 806 to the case ofBall v.
Ball.'93 The husband continued to manage the herd of registered red Braham
cattle as he saw fit after termination of the community property regime, incurring
obligations for expenses and disposing of some of the cattle. In addition, he
claimed the entire losses from the herd on his own individual income tax return and
thus substantially reduced his own income tax liability.' 94 Under this Article the
first issue is whether the herd of cattle was a community enterprise. The
description by the trial judge quoted in the court of appeal opinion included such
phrases as "the cattle operation" and "the cattle business" on the "family farm."' 95
Such descriptions suggest a community enterprise, and the husband has a duty to
preserve the enterprise and to manage it prudently "in a manner consistent with" its
mode ofuse "immediately prior to termination of the community regime." He did
not simply preserve the herd until a partition could be effectuated, instead he
managed the herd by incurring expenses for them beyond necessities and by selling
part ofthe herd. In the language of the court, "[h]e ran the operation as he saw fit!
He made trips to cattle sales and shows, incurred travel expenses, purchased
whatever he felt was necessary, and disposed of cattle when he saw fit, again
without any prior approval or consent ofMrs. Ball."' 96

192. See supra text accompanying notes 190-191.
193. 520 So. 2d 1143 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987).
194. The court concluded that the husband had breached his "fiduciary duty," wrongly opining
that the duty is owed by one co-owner to another. Id. at 1144. For a discussion of this judicial
misconception, see Spaht &Hargrave, supra note 8, § 7.19.
195. 520 So. 2d at 1143.
196. Id. at 1144.
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Even ifthe husband had authority to dispose of individual cattle in the regular
course of business,' he must "manage" (the residual category that in this case
includes alienation) the former community enterprise prudently in a manner
consistent with the mode of use immediately prior to termination of the community
regime. The court under this Article would have to consider whether under the
circumstances he was managing the enterprise prudently when he purchased
whatever he felt was necessary and disposed of the cattle when he saw fit.
Additional evidence relevant to such an inquiry is the husband's action in claiming
the entire losses from the operation of the business on his own individual income
tax return. His management practices should be measured against the mode ofuse
of the property (community enterprise) immediately prior to termination of the
community regime.
The former husband's ability to recover for the expenses he incurred after
termination ofthe regime would arguably be dependent, under the law ofordinary
co-ownership, upon fulfillment of his obligations under this Article. Only if the
expenditures of the husband were to preserve the community enterprise and to
manage itprudently should the expenses be considered "necessary"; otherwise, the
husband must prove that the expenses were for ordinary maintenance of the
community enterprise or that they are recoverable under the law of quasicontract. 9 If the husband could prove any of the foregoing, then he would be
entitled to reimbursement for one-half the amount from his former wife. A court
order granting him the use of the "community movables" (the community
enterprise referred to as "the cattle business") would not protect the husband from
the claim for an offsetting reduction based on the value of his enjoyment of the
community enterprise, if any, under Article 806. If he failed to prove authorized
expenditures under Article 806 or the law of quasi-contract, he could not claim
reimbursement. Furthermore, if he failed to comply with his duties under this
Article and the wife suffered damage to her one-half interest in the community
enterprise due to his fault, default, or neglect, he would owe her a sum to
compensate her for such damage.
8. StandardofCare as to PropertyNot UnderSpouse's Control
As mentioned earlier, if former community property is not under a coowner/spouse's control, the spouse has the obligations of a co-owner. He is
permitted, but not required, to preserve the co-owned property and, dependent
upon the circumstances, to manage it.'" He is answerable for damage to the
thing caused by his fault.2' The standard of care ("the prudent man" standard)

197. La. Civ. Code at. 2369.6 (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1), discussed infra text
accompanying notes 247-260.
198. La. Civ. Code arts. 2292-2298 (as amended by 1995 La. Acts No. 1041, § 1). See also
Symeonides & Martin, supra note 15, at 150-52.
199. See Symeonides & Martin, supra note 15, at 112-23, 130-33.
200. La. Civ. Code art. 799 (rev. 1990). See Symeonides & Martin, supra note 15, at 101-12.
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is lower than the "prudent administrator" standard similar to the one imposed by
this Article, "in that the latter standard [prudent administrator] includes
affirmative duties and the former does not."'
Can a co-owner/spouse relinquish control over former community property
to avoid the duty to preserve and to manage prudently? The answer depends
upon whether relinquishment ofcontrol violates the duty of the co-owner/spouse
to preserve and to manage prudently former community property. If the
relinquishment of control results in a failure to preserve former community
property, the spouse would be liable for breach of the obligation to preserve such
property. The co-owner/spouse who cannot relinquish control without violating
the duties imposed by this Article, but desires relief from these duties, has no
option other than to seek a judicial partition. Throughout this new series of
Articles, there is always the inherent tension between protection of the interests
of each spouse and encouragement to terminate their relationship by partition.
D. Article 2369.4. Alienation, Encumbrance, or Lease Prohibited
A spouse may not alienate, encumber, or leaseformer community
property or his undivided community interest in that property without
the concurrenceofthe otherspouse, except asprovided in thefollowing
Articles. In the absence of such concurrence, the alienation, encumbrance, or lease is a relative nullity.

1. Not Alienate, Encumber or Lease Without Concurrence
This Article is consistent with the general principle affecting all co-owners:
no co-owner may alienate, encumber or lease the co-owned thing without consent
of the other co-owners.0 2 It is also consistent with limitations imposed upon
the principle of equal management during the community property regime in the
case of transactions of such importance to the well being of the family that
consent of both spouses are required. 3 The reason to depart in this Article
from the general principle of equal management that permits either spouse to
manage or dispose of community property' is that "during the existence of
the community regime while it may be assumed that a spouse will exercise his
management powers in such a way as to promote the mutual purposes of the
community regime, no such assumption exists after termination of the community

201. Symeonides & Martin, supra note 15, at 112.
202. La. Civ. Code art. 805 (rev. 1990).
203. La. Civ. Code arts. 2347, 2349 (rev. 1979). See also La. Civ. Code art. 2369.4 cmt. a (as
added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1).
204. La. Civ. Code art. 2346 (rev. 1979).
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regime." '° Therefore, as is the case with ordinary co-owners, this Article
assures that a co-owner/spouse's ownership, including the power of disposition
generally, "be
exercised in a way that takes into account the interests of the other
26
co-owners." 0

The verbs contained in this Article are terms of art used elsewhere in the
matrimonial regimes legislation,' as well as in the law of co-ownership.m
Alienation includes sale, exchange, and other types of disposition. Encumbrance
includes mortgage; and according to a comment to Article 2347, all other
encumbrances except those imposed by law.9 Among those encumbrances
imposed by law is the "common pledge" of the debtor's property to his
unsecured creditors.2 1' Therefore, "concurrence of both spouses is not required
to subject former community property in its entirety to the satisfaction of
obligations incurred by either spouse prior to termination of the community
regime.... ,21I This conclusion is further supported by the initial reservation
made in Article 2369.1, 12' that the new Articles apply "unless otherwise

provided by law" and that proviso includes the availability to pre-termination
creditors of former community property in its entirety.213
Concurrence is to "a juridical act" by a co-owner/spouse according to the
comment to Article 2347.214 The term of art appears in Articles 2347 and
2355 which concern the management ofcommunity property during the existence
of the community property regime. Despite the fact that consent is used in
Article 805 to express the principle that all co-owners must consent to the
disposition of the co-owned thing, no distinction in effect between concurrence
and consent is intended. Consent is probably the more precise term. As is
explained in Article 1927, consent can be expressed "orally, in writing, or by
action or inaction that under the circumstances is clearly indicative of consent.12 15 Furthermore, Article 1917 applies the rules of Title IV of Book III,

205. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.4 cmt. a (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1).
206. Symeonides & Martin, supra note 15, at 141.
207. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code arts. 2347-2353 (rev. 1979).
208. La. Civ. Code art. 805 (rev. 1990).
209. La. Civ. Code art. 2347 cmt. a: "Encumbrances imposed by law are not subject to the
requirement of concurrence by the spouses."
210. La. Civ. Code art. 3183.
211. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.4 cmt. c (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1).
212. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.1 (as amended by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § I) (emphasis added):
"After termination of the community property regime, the provisions governing co-ownership apply
to former community property, unless otherwiseprovidedby law."
213. La. Civ. Code art. 2357 (rev. 1990). La. Civ. Code art. 2369.4 cmt. c cites La. Civ. Code
art. 2357 (rev. 1990) as authority for concluding that the concurrence ofthe spouses is not necessary
under Article 2369.4 "to subject former community property in its entirety to the satisfaction of
obligations incurred by either spouse prior to termination of the community regime."
214. La. Civ. Code art. 2347 cmt. c (rev. 1979): "The concurrence of a spouse is ajuridical act.
In order to concur, a spouse must have capacity to dispose of his property. If the spouse is
incompetent, he is represented by his tutor or curator."
215. La. Civ. Code art. 1927 (rev. 1984).
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16
in which Article 1927 appears, to all obligations regardless of their source.1
The use of two different terms to essentially express the same concept can be
explained historically: Articles 2347 and 2355 that contain concurrence preceded
Articles 1927 and 805 that contain consent by five and eleven years, respectively.
Because concurrenceis used as a term of art in Title VI on matrimonial regimes,
this Article continues the use of the term because it appears in the Articles that

more immediately precede the new series.
2. No Alienation of Undivided Community Interest
This Article departs from another of the general principles governing all coowners. A co-owner is permitted to dispose of his interest without the
concurrence of the other co-owners. 7 Under this Article, if the co-ownership
is of former community property, one co-owner/spouse may not dispose of his
or her undivided interest without the concurrence of the other. This prohibition
also applies during the existence of the community regime" 8 with one modification. After the termination of the community property regime, there is "a clear
implication that a spouse may concur in an alienation, encumbrance, or lease of
the other spouse's undivided interest in former community property, and thereby
render it valid."2" 9 During the existence of the community regime, there is no
such implication; and the comment to Article 2337'0 suggests that "even if a
spouse consents to the alienation of the other spouse's one-half interest in
community property during the existence of the community, the transaction is an
absolute nullity."'"
The reason this Article departs from the general rule of co-ownership law
that permits a co-owner to dispose of his undivided interest is "the need to
prevent a stranger from owning former community property in indivision with
a spouse, and to protect the right of the spouses to a partition of former
community property under the flexible principles of R.S. 9:2801, rather than the
more rigid partition rules governing ordinary co-owners.. . ."' To permit a
spouse to dispose of his or her undivided interest to a stranger, for example one
of the spouse's parents, would permit the parent to seek a judicial partition under
Those provisions mandate
the Articles governing ordinary co-owners.'

216. La. Civ. Code art. 1917 (rev. 1984): "The rules of this title are applicable also to
obligations that arise from sources other than contract to the extent that those rules are compatible
with the nature of those obligations."
217. La. Civ. Code art. 805 (rev. 1990).
218. La. Civ. Code art. 2337 (rev. 1979).
219. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.4 cmt. a (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1).
220. La. Civ. Code art. 2337 cmt. b (rev. 1979): "The disposition by a spouse of his undivided
interest in the community or in things of the community by inter vivos act in favor of a third person
is an absolute nullity."
221.
La. Civ. Code art. 2369.4 cmt. a (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1).
222. Id. cmt. b.
223. La. Civ. Code art. 809 (rev. 1990): "The mode ofpartition may be determined by agreement
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partition in kind only when the thing is susceptible of division "into as many lots
of nearly equal value as there are shares and the aggregate value of all lots is not
significantly lower than the value of the property in the state of indivision."
Under the jurisprudence, partition in kind is only available if each item (the
thing) is susceptible to division, or what is referred to as the "item" theory of
partition. 5 If partition in kind is not available, then the thing must be
partitioned by licitation or by private sale.23 6 There is no provision for the
allocation ofliabilities since for ordinary co-owners there will be no "community
of debt." Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2801 was enacted explicitly to adopt an
"aggregate" theory of partition to permit flexibility in allocation of assets and to
grant 7authority to allocate liabilities unavailable under ordinary co-ownership
22
law.
3. Except as Provided in the FollowingArticles
The Articles that follow this Article provide three different exceptions to the
general principle that concurrence ofthe co-owner/spouses is required to alienate,
encumber, or lease former community property.228 The three exceptions consist
of exclusive authority bestowed upon one of the two co-owner/spouses to dispose
of former community property under the following circumstances: (1) when a
2 9
movable is issued or registered as provided by law in the name of one spouse;
(2) when one spouse is the sole manager of a community enterprise; 230 and (3)
when one spouse is judicially authorized to act alone.231 The reasons for each
exception are discussed later in this commentary, but each bears a striking
resemblance to an instance ofexclusive management ofcommunity property during
et the
h redacters
eatr
the existence of the community regime. 232 As a general cm
comment,
concluded it was desirable to continue two of the instances of exclusive management that exist during the community property regime but with appropriate
safeguards-for the sole manager of a community enterprise ifthe transaction is in
the regular course of business2 33 and for a spouse the possibility of judicial
authorization to act alone if it is necessary and the action is in the best interest of
the petitioning spouse and not detrimental to the interest of the other spouse.234

of all the co-owners. In the absence of such an agreement, a co-owner may demand judicial partition."
224. La. Civ. Code art. 810 (rev. 1990).
225. See cases cited in Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 8, § 7.25, at 341-42.
226. La. Civ. Code art. 811 (rev. 1990).
227. See discussion of the entire subject in Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 8, §§ 7.25-7.28, at
341-53.
228. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.4 cmt. d (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1).
229. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.5 (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1).
230. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.6 (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1).
231. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.7 (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1).
232. La. Civ. Code arts. 2350, 2351, 2355 (rev. 1979).
233. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.6 (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1).
234. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.7 (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1).
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It may well have been unnecessary to provide for the remaining instance of
exclusive management, movables issued or registered in one spouse's name,"3
since the same result would probably have followed from the application of the
specific registration statute. 2 6
4. RelativeNullity Without Concurrence
Rather than depend upon the application ofgeneral principles oflaw about the
effect of an act by a co-owner/spouse without the concurrence of the other, this
Article declares that the act is a relative nullity. It is possible that the same result
would have obtained under Article 2031, which classifies a contract as relatively
null "when it violates a rule intended for the protection of private parties, as when
a party lacked capacity or did not give free consent at the time the contract was
'
made."237
However, the examples of a relatively null contract recited by Article
2031, as well as examples of when prescription commences on the annulment
action,2" suggest that the alienation prohibited by this Article might not be a
relatively null contract. Consistent with the decision to permit one co-owner/spouse to consent to the alienation ofthe other's undivided interest, the redactors
concluded that an alienation of the other co-owner's interest in the former
community property should only be a relative, not absolute,239 nullity. The same
rule exists during the community regime for an alienation, encumbrance, or lease

ofcommunity property by one spouse without the concurrence ofthe other spouse
when concurrence is required.2'0
The consequences of declaring the transaction a relative nullity include: (1)
the potential for the confirmation 24' by the other spouse whose concurrence was
not obtained; 242 (2) limiting who may invoke the nullity to the person "for whose
interest the ground for nullity was established .... ,;243 and (3)"curing" the nullity
by five years' liberative prescription.2"
235. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.5 (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1).
236. Spaht &Hargrave, supra note 8, § 5.8, at 159-60.
237. La. Civ. Code art. 2031 (rev. 1994).
238. La. Civ. Code art. 2032 (rev. 1994): "Action of annulment of a relatively null contract
must be brought within five years from the time the ground for nullity either ceased, as in the case
of incapacity or duress, or was discovered, as in the case of error or fraud."
239. La. Civ. Code art. 2030 (rev. 1994): "A contract isabsolutely null when it violates a rule
of public order, as when the object of a contract is illicit or immoral. A contract that is absolutely
null may not be confirmed."
240. La. Civ. Code art. 2353 (rev. 1979). See also La. Civ. Code art. 2369.4 cmt. e (as added
by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1).
241. La. Civ. Code art. 1842 (rev. 1994) (provides for express and tacit confirmations).
242. La. Civ. Code art. 2031 (rev. 1994): "A contract that is only relatively null may be
confirmed."
243. La. Civ. Code art. 2031 (rev. 1994).
244. La. Civ. Code art. 2032 (rev. 1994): "Action of annulment of a relatively null contract
must be brought within five years from the time the ground for nullity either ceased, as in the case
of incapacity or duress, or was discovered, as in the case of error or fraud."
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E. Article 2369.5. Alienation of RegisteredMovables
A spouse may alienate, encumber, or lease movables issued or
registeredin his name as provided by law.

1. Movable Issued or Registered in His Name
Movables issued or registered as provided by law include "movables
regulated by the Commercial Laws (R.S. 10:8-101 et seq.) and the Vehicle
Certificate of Title Law (R.S. 32:701 et seq.) (investment securities)....
The comment to Article 2351, which concerns alienation, encumbrance, or lease
of movables issued or registered in one spouse's name during the community
regime, adds shares of stock.2"
2. As Provided by Law
This limiting clause assures that the movables to which the Article applies
are only those for which a specific legal registration scheme exists. The same
modifying clause appears in Article 2351 which governs the alienation, encumbrance or lease of registered movables during the existence of the community
property regime.24 7 Necessarily excluded are horses, dogs, and the like for
which there may be registration but "not as provided by law."
F. Article 2369.6. Alienation, Encumbrance, or Lease of Movable Assets of
Former Community Enterprise
The spouse who is the sole manager of a former community
enterprisemay alienate,encumber,or lease its movables in the regular
course of business.

1. Sole Managerof a Former Community Enterprise
The language sole manager must be interpreted consistently with the
identical phrase in Article 2350.24' The comment to Article 2350 explains:

245. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.5 cmt. b (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1).
246. La. Civ. Code art. 2351 cmt. a (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1).
247. La. Civ. Code art. 2351 (rev. 1979).
248. La. Civ. Code art. 2350 (rev. 1979) (emphasis added): "The spouse who is the sole
manager of a community enterprise has the exclusive right to alienate, encumber, or lease its
movables unless the movables are issued in the name of the other spouse or the concurrence of the
other spouse is required by law."
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"A spouse may act alone, that is, to the exclusion of the other spouse, when the
other spouse does not participate in the management of a community business.""4 9 The difficulty of determining whether a spouse participates in the
management of a community business has been the subject of scholarly
commentary.'
It should be less difficult to determine if a spouse is participating in the management of a former community enterprise, since the former
spouses are unlikely to be jointly participating in the operation and management
of the former community enterprise.
This Article represents a departure from the law of co-ownership, 25
similar to the departure from equal management made by Article 2350 during the
existence of the community regime. The latter is justified on the basis of
facilitating commerce since the power to alienate movables of a community
enterprise, for example the inventory of a business, is the essence of the
operation of a business. 2 Because concurrence of the spouses in the day-today operation of a business is impractical and third parties need the security of
reliance on business transactions, the exclusive authority vested in the sole
manager is desirable during the existence of the regime. After the termination
of the regime the only justification for the exception is to maintain an income
source for the former spouses; "it permits the enterprise to continue to operate
and produce co-owned income." 53 There is an important limitation, however,
contained in this Article that does not appear in Article 2350: the alienation of
movables by the sole manager of the community enterprise must be in the
regularcourse of business.
2. In the Regular Course of Business
This prepositional phrase appears in Article 2040,254 an article that limits
the revocatory action to acts of the debtor not in the regular course of business.
A similar phrase in the predecessor to Article 20402" has been interpreted by

249. La. Civ. Code art. 2350 cmt. b (rev. 1979).
250. Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 8, § 5.6.
251.
La. Civ. Code art. 2369.6 cmt. b (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1): "No such
exception is present in the law of simple co-ownership."

252. La. Civ. Code art. 2350 cmt. b (rev. 1979): "This provision establishes an exception to the
principle of equal management in the interest of commerce."
253. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.6 cmt. b (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1).
254. Id. "This phrase is borrowed from Civil Code Article 2040 (rev. 1984), governing the
revocatory action." La. Civ. Code art. 2040 (rev. 1984): "An obligee may not annul a contract made
by the obligor in the regular course of his business."
255. La. Civ. Code art. 1986 (1870) (revised by 1984 La. Acts No. 331, § 1) (emphasis added):
No sale of property, or other contract made in the usual course of the party's business,
nor any payment of a just debt in money, shall be set aside under this section, although
the debtor were [sic] insolvent to the knowledge of the creditor with whom he contracted,
and although the other creditors are injured thereby, if such contract were made more than
one year before bringing the suit to avoid it,
and if it contain no other cause of nullity

than the preference given to one creditor over another.
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the jurisprudence25 to include a transaction by a merchant with another
merchant or customer typical of the ordinary operation of his business. 7 A
transaction by which the owner of a business sold all of his stock of goods,
financed on long-term credit, was not in the "usual course of a party's
business."'" These cases are obviously fact sensitive, requiring an examination of all of the circumstances with a view to discerning the motive of the
owner of the business. The motive of the owner of the business in a revocatory
action may be to avoid the payment of his debts. The motive of the coowner/spouse who is the sole manager of a former community enterprise may be
to defeat the community property rights of the other spouse. Thus, examining
all of the circumstances to discover the motive of the co-owner/spouse under this
Article is authorized by the phrase "in the regular course of business."
Adopting the phrase as a limitation upon the exclusive authority of the sole
manager to alienate, encumber, or lease the movables of the former community
enterprise is a conservative 259 approach. The avowed purpose of the limitation
is "to protect the other spouse [non-managing spouse]," yet permit the enterprise
to function and produce co-owned income. 26 The compromise achieved by
this Article recognizes that the former community enterprise needs the continuity
of the exclusive authority of the sole manager; but the non-managing spouse
needs some reasonable protection, which is, after all, the purpose of the entire
new series of Articles.

The comment to La. Civ. Code art. 2040 (rev. 1984) reads: "This Article reproduces the substance
of C.C. Art. 1986 (1870). It does not change the law."
256. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.6 cmt. b (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1): "Jurisprudence interpreting the phrase in Article 2040 may be relied upon to determine its meaning in this
Article."
257. See Xiques, Syndic v. F. Rivas, 16 La. Ann. 402 (1862) (wholesaler/retailer of cigars pays
his bill to another wholesaler [merchant to merchant] by transferring type of cigars desired by
transferee for full value in satisfaction of his debt; court held in the "usual course of a party's
business"); Thompson v. Gordon, 12 La. 260 (1838).
258. Beck v. Brady, 7 La. Ann. 124, 126 (1852):
It was out of the usual course ofbusiness, and unlawful, for an insolvent to sell his whole
stock of goods on long credits, and without any security from the purchaser .... He
purchased the stock with no intention of carrying on business as a dry goods merchant,
but immediately commenced the sacrifice of the property at such prices for cash, as
produced such a rush on the store as compelled him and his clerks, at one time, to
barricade the doors.
The whole affair was as unusual, anti-commercial and fraudulent on the part of Brown
as of Brady.
There is a paucity of cases on the subject and virtually all were decided before the turn of the
century: Xiques, 16 La. Ann. at 402; Beck,7 La. Ann. at 124; Maurin & Co. v. Rouquer, 19 La. 594
(1841); Dwight v. Bemiss, 16 La. 145 (1840); Thompson v. Gordon, 12 La. 260 (1838); Robbins v.
Leverich, 6 La. 340 (1834); Coddington v. Tupper, 4 La. 126 (1832).
259. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.6 cmt. b (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1): "There is an
important limitation in this Article upon actions by a spouse who is sole manager of a former
community enterprise with regard to its movable assets."
260. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.6 cmt. b (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1).
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G. Article 2369.7. Court Authorization to Act Alone
A spouse may be authorizedby the court in a summary proceeding
to act without the concurrence ofthe other spouse, upon showing allof
thefollowing:
(1) The action is necessary.
(2) The action is in the best interest of thepetitioningspouse
and not detrimental to the interest of the nonconcurring
spouse.
(3) The otherspouse is an absentperson orarbitrarilyrefitses
to concur, or is unable to concur due to physical incapacity,
mentalincompetence, commitment, imprisonment,or temporary
absence.

1. JudicialAuthority to Act Alone in a Summary Proceeding
This third and final exception to the general rule that both co-owner/spouses
must concur in the alienation or encumbrance of former community property
permits "judicial recourse when the spouses cannot agree on management or
other decisions affecting former community property.... "26
This Article
departs from the law of ordinary co-ownership "which allows court intervention
only for matters of 'use and management' and only when 'partition is not
available."' 262 Obviously, this Article conveys a broader right to judicial
intervention than the general law of co-ownership.263 If alienation, encumbrance or lease under Article 2369.4 does not include management and use, 2'
this Article does not apply. Instead, the general articles on co-ownership have
not been displaced and judicial authorization, although more limited, is still
available.265 Whether judicial authorization is sought during the existence or
after the termination of the community regime, the authorization occurs explicitly
in both Articles in "summary proceedings." The rule to show cause, a summary

261. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.7 cmt. a (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1).
262. Id. The comment to Article 2369.7 cites La. Civ. Code art. 803 (rev. 1990), which provides
as follows: "When the mode of use and management of the thing held in indivision is not
determined by an agreement ofall the co-owners and partition is not available, a court, upon petition
by a co-owner, may determine the use and management." See Symeonides & Martin, supra note 15,
at 130-33.
263. La. Civ. Code art. 2359.7 cmt. a (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1).
264. The argument can be made that the greater power includes the lesser;, and if the court can
authorize one spouse to act alone to sell former community property without the concurrence of the
other spouse (alienation), then such judicial authorization can be obtained to use or manage such
property, with one exception. The more specific statutory provision that permits the court to order
the use and occupancy of the family residence, etc. (La. R.S. 9:374B) should prevail and require
proof of the criteria mentioned in that statute.
265. La. Civ. Code art. 803 (rev. 1990). See Symeonides & Martin, supra note 15, at 130-33.
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proceeding,'" serves to expedite what could otherwise be a lengthy, cumbersome process.
Because this Article permits judicial authorization to act alone when
concurrenceis required,there can be no judicial authorization to act where one
spouse has exclusive authority to alienate or encumber former community
property. For example, the non-managing spouse may not seek authority to act
alone to alienate movables of a former community enterprise over the objection
of the sole manager spouse.267 The same would be true of the spouse who
seeks authorization to act alone to alienate former community movables issued
or registered in the name of the other spouse alone.2 6 Restricting judicial
authorization to act alone to circumstances where concurrence is required
contrasts with judicial authorization to act during the community regime when
a spouse is an absent person.269 If one spouse is an absent person, the other
spouse may seek judicial authority to alienate community property subject to the
exclusive management of the absent spouse. A situational distinction exists
between the spouse who is an absent person and spouses after termination of the
community regime. In the case of a spouse who is an absent person, there is no
countervailing policy of encouraging partition to promote, only the policy of
assuring that the spouse who is not absent can use community property to
support himself and the family.
This Article is very similar to Article 2355 which permits a spouse during
the existence of the community regime to seek judicial authorization to act alone
when concurrence of both spouses is required.270 However, there are limitations upon the exercise ofjudicial authorization in this Article that do not appear
in Article 2355.271 The limitations in this Article are intended to discourage
the former spouses from remaining co-owners and using judicial intervention to
manage former community property. If it were possible to avoid a partition and
simply depend upon judicial intervention, the spouse with greater economic
power and, by virtue of the circumstances, greater control over former

266. La. Code Civ. P.arts. 2591, 2595.
267. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.6 (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1).
268. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.5 (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1).
269. La. Civ. Code art. 2355.1 (rev. 1990). For the definition of absent person, see La. Civ.
Code art. 47 (rev. 1990).
270. A spouse, in a summary proceeding, may be authorized by the court to act without
the concurrence of the other spouse upon showing that such action is in the best interest
of the family and that the other spouse arbitrarily refuses to concur or that concurrence
may not be obtained due to the physical incapacity, mental incompetence, commitment,
imprisonment, temporary absence of the other spouse, or because the other spouse is an
absent person.
La. Civ. Code art. 2355 (rev. 1990).
271. Id. See also La. Civ. Code art. 2369.7 cmt. b (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1):
"However, to obtain judicial authorization under this Article requires more stringent proof than that
required for obtaining the same authorization during the existence of the community regime. Under
this Article a spouse must additionally prove that the action is 'necessary.' Compare C.C. Art. 2355
(rev. 1979)."
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community property could manage co-owned former community property
indefinitely. This Article seeks to achieve the ideal balance between legal
mechanisms that protect each co-owner/spouse but do not discourage partition
that ends co-ownership.
2. Action is Necessary
The requirement that the action requested by the spouse be necessary is a
limitation that does not appear in Article 2355.72 The limitation upon court
intervention is purposeful. To properly balance the need to protect the coowner/spouses with the need not to impede partition, this Article requires more
proof than for judicial intervention during the existence of the community regime
when the spouses are prohibited from seeking a judicial partition. " Since
judicial intervention that permits one spouse to act alone seriously impinges upon
the other spouse's rights as a co-owner, the term necessary, which has no
definition,2 74 should be restrictively interpreted. Such a conclusion is supported
by the additional limitation contained in this Article: the action is not detrimental to the interest of the nonconcurring spouse.
3. Action is in Best Interest of the PetitioningSpouse and Not
Detrimentalto the Interest of the NonconcurringSpouse
The second requirement for judicial intervention is that the action be in the
best interest of the "petitioning spouse" and also not detrimental to the
nonconcurring spouse. Under Article 2355, the equivalent criteria is that the
action be in the best interest of "the family," a term defined, according to the
comment, in its narrowest sense."7 The substitution of different criteria in this
Article recognizes that after termination of the community property regime it is
almost impossible to envision action that is in the best interest of the family.
The family is no longer intact in many cases, and the appropriate substitute
criteria must balance the interest of the spouse who seeks judicial intervention
to act alone and the other who is resisting the action proposed. It is not enough,
particularly in light of the purpose of this series of Articles, to consider only the

272. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.7 cmt. b (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1): "[T]o obtain
judicial authorization under this Article requires more stringent proof than that required for obtaining
the same authorization during the existence of the community regime."
273. La. Civ. Code art. 2336 (rev. 1982). But see the narrow exception of La. R.S. 9:2802
(1991) which permits a spouse during the existence of the community regime to file an action to
partition community property if it is incidental to another action that will result in a termination of
the community property regime.
274. There is no definition of the term "necessary" in the Article or in the article of the Civil
Code containing definitions. La. Civ. Code art. 3506.
275. La. Civ. Code art. 2355 cmt. (rev. 1979): "The word 'family' in this provision refers to
the limited family concept of Article 3556 (12) [3506 (12)] of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 as
amended by Acts 1979, No. 711, §1."
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best interest of the petitioning spouse. The court must also be assured that the
action will not prove detrimental to the other spouse who is resisting the action
and owns a one-half interest in the property.
The two limitations contained in this Article that do not appear in Article
2355 require more stringent proof than required by that Article to obtain judicial
authorization to act alone. By requiring more stringent proof to obtain judicial
authority, the former spouse who would benefit by the continuation of the coownership relationship with sole management powers conferred by the court is
encouraged instead to obtain a judicial partition and terminate the relationship.
4. Absent Person or ArbitrarilyRefises to Concur or is Unable to
Concur
Finally, as is the case under Article 2355,276 to obtain judicial authorization
to act alone the petitioning spouse must prove one of three circumstances: (1) the
other spouse is an absent person;27 or (2) the other spouse arbitrarily [without
good reason] refuses to concur; 7 8 or (3) the other spouse is unable to concur
"due to physical incapacity, mental incompetence, commitment, imprisonment,
or temporary absence."2 '9
H. Article 2369.8. Right to Partition;No Exclusion by Agreement; Judicial
Partition
A spouse has the right to demand partition offormer community
property at any time. A contrary agreement is absolutely null.
If the spouses are unable to agree on the partition,either spouse
may demandjudicialpartitionwhich shall be conducted in accordance
with R.S. 9:2801.

1. Right to Demandat Any Time
The right of a co-owner/spouse to demand a partition at any time is a
departure from the law governing the spouses during the existence of the

276. La. Civ. Code art. 2355 (rev. 1990): "A spouse, in a summary proceeding, may be
authorized by the court to act without the concurrence of the other spouse upon showing that such
action is in the best interest of the family and that the other spouse arbitrarily refuses to concur or
that concurrence may not be obtained due to the physical incapacity, mental incompetence,
commitment, imprisonment, temporary absence of the other spouse, or because the other spouse is
an absent person." See also Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 8, § 5.9, at 161-63.
277. See La. Civ. Code art. 47 (rev. 1990).
278. Compare La. Civ. Code art. 2355 (rev. 1990), supra note 276.
279. Compare La. Civ. Code art. 2355 (rev. 1990), supra note 276. For an interpretationof the
identical clause in La. Civ. Code art. 2355, see Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 8, § 5.9, at 161-63.
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community regime.s Because the community regime is a "distinct species"
of co-ownership,28 ' the spouses who each own an undivided one-half interest
in community property may nonetheless not demand a judicial partition during
the existence of the regime. However, after termination of the "distinct species"
of co-ownership, the co-owner/spouses are for most purposes ordinary co-owners
with the right to demand a judicial partition of former community property.
The right of an ordinary co-owner to demand a judicial partition' is
qualified by the following modifications: (1) the co-owners may agree that there
will be no partition for "up to fifteen years, or for such other period as provided
in R.S. 9:17022 3 or other specific law";2 and (2) the co-owners may not
partition a co-owned thing if "its use is indispensable for the enjoyment of
another thing owned by one or more of the co-owners."2 5 Therefore, the first
sentence of this Article is an obvious deviation from the modifications that
preclude a judicial partition under general co-ownership law. This Article
explicitly declares that a judicial partition is available "at any time," and there
is no limitation or other modification imposed upon the exercise of that right.
The comment to the Article is consistent with such a conclusion.286
2. Contrary Agreement is Absolutely Null

In the second sentence of this Article, an agreement between the coowner/spouses prohibiting a partition is declared absolutely null with all of the
resulting consequences. 287 The agreement, which is permissible in part under
the general law of co-ownership,
cannot be confirmed;2 9 and the action
280. La. Civ. Code art. 2336 (rev. 1982).
281. La. Civ. Code art. 2337 cmt. a (rev. 1979).
282. La. Civ. Code art. 807 (rev. 1990): "No one may be compelled to hold a thing in
indivision with another unless the contrary has been provided by law or juridical act.
Any co-owner has a right to demand partition of a thing held in indivision."
283. Persons holding property in common may agree that there shall not be a partition of
the property held in common for a specific period of time, not to exceed fifteen years.
However, persons holding in common a nuclear electric generating plant or unit, or the
site of such plant or unit, located in this state may agree that such plant or unit or site
shall not be partitioned for a period of time not to exceed ninety-nine years. Any
agreement under the provisions of this Section shall be in writing and shall be valid
irrespective of the provisions of Civil Code Article 807.
La. R.S. 9:1702 (1991).
284. La. Civ. Code art. 807 (rev. 1990). See also La. R.S. 9:1112 (1991).
285. La. Civ. Code art. 808 (rev. 1990).
286. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.8 cmt. a (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1): "This Article
provides that a spouse may demand partition of former community property at any time."
287. La. Civ. Code art. 2030 (rev. 1990): "A contract is absolutely null when it violates a rule of
public order, as when the object ofa contract is illicit or immoral. A contract that is absolutely null may
not be confirmed.
Absolute nullity may be invoked by any person or may be declared by the court on its own initiative."
288. La. Civ. Code art. 807 (rev. 1990).
289. La. Civ. Code art. 1842 (rev. 1984): "Confirmation is a declaration whereby a person cures
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to have the agreement recognized as null is imprescriptible.29 The declaration
that the agreement is absolutely null is tantamount to declaring such an
agreement against public policy. 9'
The public policy involved is the same one originally expressed in the
general law of co-ownership, that is that co-owners are prohibited from agreeing
not to partition co-owned property. The reason underlying such historical policy
for co-owners was that such an agreement would thereafter preclude any
alteration of the relationship and if problems arose between co-owners the
property could not be developed because of lack of unanimity. Historically,
under general co-ownership law there was no possibility ofjudicial intervention
as a means of remedying a bad co-ownership relationship, only of partition.
To permit such agreements, as the general law of co-ownership now does,
could result in subverting the purpose of this new series of Articles. In a weak
moment because of the intense personal emotions of divorce, one spouse could
prevail upon the other who is more vulnerable292 to agree to no judicial
partition of the former community property for ten years. The ability to use
judicial intervention to resolve differences of opinion thereafter would be
severely restricted.293 Furthermore, there would be no judicial intervention
available if the former community property were subject to the exclusive
management of one of the two former spouses. The former spouse, for example,
who is the sole manager of a community enterprise or in whose name the stock
is registered could impose upon the other spouse to consent to an agreement not
to partition former community property, or just the enterprise or stock, for ten
years. The other spouse would have no viable remedy to protect his or her
interest other than damages for breach of the obligation to preserve and to

the relative nullity of an obligation."
290. La. Civ. Code art. 2032 (rev. 1984): "Action for annulment of an absolutely null contract
does not prescribe."
291. See La. Civ. Code art. 2030 (rev. 1984), supra note 287.
292. For a parallel concern, see La. Civ. Code art. 2329 (rev. 1979) that requires judicial
approval of a matrimonial agreement executed during the existence of the community regime.
Judicial approval requires proof that the agreement serves the spouses' best interests and that both
spouses understand the governing principles and rules of the new regime. The purpose of the
requirement is to protect the spouse whose contributions to the marriage are largely non-economic
from the imposition of the other spouse.
In part, the need for special protection in this Article as well as Article 2329 is a result of the
narrow interpretation of the meaning of duress under La. Civ. Code art. 1959 (rev. 1984). The term
has been interpreted to require either violence or threats. Id. at cmt. b. The imposition envisioned
by Article 2369.8 (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433. § 1),
does not reach the level of violence or
threats, yet nonetheless may compel a spouse to agree to not partition former community property.
The compulsion could result from emotional vulnerability or economic duress, neither of which has
historically been considered enough to constitute duress. See Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 8, §
7.23, at 337-39.
293. See supratext accompanying notes 261-279 (discussion ofcriteria for judicial intervention
under La. Civ. Code art. 2369.7 (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1)).
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manage prudently. If the agreement were only relatively null,' 94 then it could
be confirmed expressly 9 ' by a writing executed immediately thereafter under
the same sort of imposition. The confirmation could even be tacit, by certain
conduct of the spouse under the same imposition.2
Thus, two almost
simultaneous acts would result in a subversion of the prohibition and its
policy.297
3. JudicialPartitionUnder With Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2801
The co-owner/spouse who seeks a judicial partition must comply with the
provisions of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2801. Section 2801 contains detailed
provisions on the judicial partition of former community property, adopting the
concept of the "aggregate theory" of partition. 298 This Article explicitly
conforms the law to current practice and the implicit interpretation of the courts
that Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2801, being the more specific statute governing
only former community property, prevails over the more general provisions of
co-ownership law that apply to all other co-owned property. Derogation from
the rules of general co-ownership law on judicial partition is significant. Under
general co-ownership law when the co-owned thing is not susceptible to division
in kind, "the court shall decree a partition by licitation or by private
sale.. ." " To be susceptible to division in kind, the thing held in indivision
must be "susceptible to division into as many lots of nearly equal value as there
are shares and the aggregate value of all lots is not significantly lower than the
value of the property in the state of indivision. ' 300 The comment to that
Article explains that it does not change the law, 30 ' and under prior law the
inequities that existed in the judicial partition of former community property3 °2
compelled the enactment of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2801.

294.

La. Civ. Code art. 2031 (rev. 1984).

295. "Confirmation is a declaration whereby a person cures the relative nullity of an obligation.
An express act of confirmation must contain or identify the substance of the obligation and
evidence the intention to cure its relative nullity." La. Civ. Code art. 1842 (rev. 1984).
296. Id. "Tacit confirmation may result from voluntary performance of the obligation."
297. For an analogy, see the refusal to treat a gambling debt as a natural obligation under La.
Civ. Code art. 1762 (rev. 1984) because a subsequent promise to pay it would result in an onerous

contract. La. Civ. Code art. 1761 (rev. 1984). "[C]ertain obligations that the law renders invalid for
reasons of general policy, such as gambling debts and loans bearing usurious interest, should not be
recognized as producing the two effects of validity of spontaneous performance and enforceability

of a new promise. Ifa new promise were enforceable in such a situation, the general policy that lies
at the foundation of the prohibition would be defeated. For this reason, a new promise is not
enforceable under such circumstances." Id. at cmt. d.
298. See Spaht &Hargrave, supra note 8, §§ 7.25-7.28.
299. La. Civ. Code art. 811 (rev. 1990).
300. La. Civ. Code art. 810 (rev. 1990).
301. "This provision restates the principle of Article 1340 ofthe Louisiana Civil Code of 1870.
It does not change the law." La. Civ. Code art. 810 cmt. (rev. 1990).
302. See Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 8, § 7.25 (discussion of cases).
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III. CONCLUSION
After almost ten years of being urged to resolve the problems related to the
management of former community property, the Legislature enacted a series of
seven new Articles that address the most significant issues. Principal among
those issues was the lack of affirmative duties imposed upon the former spouses,
as well as a standard of care in managing former community property that was
perceived to be entirely too low to protect the other former spouse. By the
imposition of affirmative duties and the careful particularization of a higher
standard of care, the new Articles resolve the most contentious areas of concern.
The balance sought between encouraging partition if the relationship of coowners sours and protecting each co-owner/spouse before partition, which
sometimes involves lengthy preparation, is delicate. The new Articles, hopefully,
achieve the appropriate balance between two inherently conflicting policies.
What the Articles clearly do not attempt to solve is the "root" of the
problem-marriages that end in divorce. Divorce, the context for raising the
issues the new legislation attempts to resolve, creates the unusual level of
hostility so unique to these co-owners. Furthermore, the management and
stewardship of former community property affects not only the two coowner/spouses but also the "family," which must necessarily be of utmost
concern to lawmakers. Until the social ill of too many divorces is solved,
unforeseen issues not resolved by these new Articles will develop and beg for
solutions. At some point, the Legislature may be forced to examine the "root"
of the problem and recognize that families cannot grow and flourish if the "root"
is not nourished.

